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Cert to N.C. SC 




- Stay Granted By North Carolina SC] 
1. SU}l}1ARY: This is the first petition for cert 
challenging the constitutionality of a death sentence made 
pursuant to the post-State v. Waddell (194 SE2d 19) death 
penalty statute enacted April 8, 1974 (N.C. Sess. Laws 1973 
[2d Sess., 1974), c. 1201, § 1, amending N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-17 [1974 cum. supp.]) by the North Carolina legislature. 
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2. FACTS & CONTENTIONS: Petrs Waxton (aged 24) 
and Woodson (23) and two other black men -- Tucker (18) and 
Carroll (19) -- planned the armed robbery of an E-Z Shop in 
Dunn, N.C. Tucker and petr Waxton entered the store while 
Carroll and petr Woodson remained in a car outside. During 
the robbery, Tucker killed the white shop assistant. All four 
were indicted for first-degree felony murder. The State allowed 
Tucker and Carroll to plead guilty to lesser (non-capital) of-
fenses in return for their testimony at trial. All four men 
testified in their own defense. The jury convicted petrs of first-
degre e murder and the court imposed the mandatory death sentence 
pursuant to the new North Carolina law. 
North Carolina SC affirmed. It rejected petrs' arguments 
. ~hat the death sentences violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
a. Petrs (~-vhose petition \vas prepared by NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund) reiterate the contentions set out in Fowler 
v. North Carolina (No. 73-7031). They claim that the new statute 
does not make imposition of the death penalty in North Carolina 
any less arbitrary than it was before. They note that the death 
penalty is still discussed on voir dire of the venire, that the 
trial judge may instruct the jury that death is mandatory, if the y 
find first-degree murder, and that defense counsel is entitled to 
tell the jury during summation that death will result to defendc.:-.:::s 
on a finding of first-degree murder. The result, according to 
petrs, is that juries are tempted to find guilt on lesser 
.. ~· . 
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(non-cupital) included offenses in sympathetic cases -- thus 
rendering non-mandatory in fact the mandatory penalty. 
Petrs also contend that the death sentences in 
this case demonstrate the arbitrary infliction of the 
punishment: neither petr did the actual killing, and petr 
Woodson was not even in the store at the time of the killing. 
b. Resp concedes this is a hold for Fmvler. 
4. DISCUSSION: This is a hold for Fowler, unless the 
Court wishes to take a post-Waddell statutory case and/or one 
in which prosecutoria1 discretion and the felony-murder rule 
provide & 11gloss" on mandatory death penalties. 
There is a response. 
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Capital Case - North Carolina Statute 
Mandatory sentence of death whenever the defendant is 
convicted of one of a series of specified crimes. 
Statute is not limited to a few particularly heinous 
crimes. It provides for capital punishment in all cases of 
felony murder, and for murder "perpetrated by means of poison, 
lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other 
kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing". 
This seems to be the statutory equivalent of North 
Carolina's post-Furman judicial construction of its earlier 
statute. 
Jury discretion remains wide. If it thinks capital 
punishment is inappropriate, the jury in a felony murder case 
may (i) convict, not for murder, but only an attempt to commit 
the felony; (ii) convict on a lesser-included offense, but 
only if there is evidence to support it, or (iii) refuse to 
convict the defendant of anything. 
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Mr. Justic~r1haMl 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
vi!r . Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Mr. Justice Stewart 
Circulated: JUN 7 1976 
NO. 75-5491, WOODSON v. NORTH CAROLINA R. C: • !'C 1 ' t r ' : _ _ 
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, MR. JUSTICE POWELL, and 
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS: 
The question in this case is whether the imposition of a death 
sentence for the crime of first degree murder under the law of 
North Carolina violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
The petitioners in this case were convicted of participa-
tion in an armed robbery of a convenience food store, in the course 
of which the cashier was killed and a customer seriously wounded. 
There were four participants in .the robbery: the petitioners Tyrone 
Woodson and Luby Waxton, and ~wo others, Leonard Tucker and 
Johnnie Lee Carroll. ·Tucker and Carroll testified for the prosecu-
tion after being permitted to plead guilty to lesser offenses; Woodson 





According to the testimony, the four men had been discus s ing 
a possible robbery for some time. On the day of the robbery, June 3, 
197 4, Woodson and Tucker drank two bottles of wine together. 
Woodson then left Tucker and went over to the mobile home where 
he was staying with a friend and continued drinking. About 9:30p.m., 
Waxton and Tucker came to the trailer. When Woodson came out, 
Waxton hit him. Waxton testified that he struck Woodson because 
he said something to "disrespect" him; Tucker and Woodson testified 
that Waxton wanted Woodson to sober up and come along on the robbery. 
The three went to Waxton' s trailer where they met Carroll, 
who had borrowed his brother's car for the evening. Waxton, 
according to the testimony of the others, armed himself with a 
nickel-plated derringer. Tucker handed Woodson a rifle, which he 
carried into the front seat of !he car. The four then set out. 
Carroll was driving, with Woodson in the front seat next to him. 
Tucker and Waxton rode in th~ back seat. The first time they came 
to the store, they passed by because there were too many customers . 
. 
They drove up a dirt road where Woodson got out of the car and tested 
the rifle. They then returned to the store. 
75-5491, Woodson 
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Tucker and Wa.xton got out of the car and went into the store 
while Carroll and Woodson remained outside as lookouts. Tucker 
asked for, received, and paid for a package of Kools. Wa.xton in 
turn asked for cigarettes. As the cashier, Mrs. Shirley Whittington 
Butler, handed the pack to him, Wa.xton pulled the derringer out of 
his hip pocket, placed it against Mrs. Butler's neck and fired one · 
shot. Mrs. Butler fell backwards, fatally wounded. Waxton took 
the money tray from the register and gave it to Tucker, who carried 
it from the store. As he reached the door, Tucker ran into a 
customer, said "look out" and pushed past him. After he was out-
side, Tucker heard a second shot from inside the store, and a couple 
of minutes later Wa.xton came out, walking fast and carrying a hand-
ful of paper money. Tucker and Wa.xton got in the car ai?-d the four 
drove away. 
Wa.xton' s testimony ag~eed in most respects, except that 
he claimed he never had a gun and Tucker had shot both the cashier 
and the customer. 
The four men were arrested and indicted for first degree 
murder and armed robbery. Waxton was also indicted for assault 
1/ 
with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill, not resulting in death. 
75-5491, Woods 
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Before the trial of the two petitioners, Tucker and Carroll, had 
2/ 
both been permitted to plead guilty to lesser offenses. During 
trial Waxton asked to be allowed to plead guilty to the same lesser 
offenses to which Tucker had pleaded guilty, but the Solicitor re-
_1_/ 
fused to accept the pleas. Woodson maintained throughout the trial 
that he had been coerced by Waxton, that he was therefore innocent, 
and that he would not consider pleading guilty to anything. 
The petitioners were found guilty on all charges, and, as 
was required by statute, sentenced to death. The Supreme Court 
of North Carolina affirmed State v. Woodson, 215 S. E. 2d 607, 
287 N.C. 578 (1975 ). We granted certiorari, U.S. --
to consider whether the imposition of the death penalty in these cases 
comports with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution. We now reverse. 
North Carolina, prior to 1972, provided that in cases of 
first degree murder, the jury could in its unbridled discretion choose 
whether the convicted defendant should be sentenced to death or to 
_!I 
life imprisonment. After the decision of this Court in Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
in State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 194 S. E 2d 19 (1973 ), interpreted 
Furman as holding that the death penalty could not be imposed by a 
-75-5491, VVoodson 
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judge or jury who was free to act arbitrarily, but not that the death 
penalty was per se cruel and unusual. It then held that the proviso 
of the death penalty statutes which gave the jury the option of return-
ing a verdict of guilty without capital punishment was unconstitutional,. 
but that the provision was severable so that the statutes survived 
5/ 
as mandatory death penalty statutes. 
The North Carolina General Assembly in 1974 followed 
the court's lead in enacting a new version of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
17 which was essentially unchanged from the prior version except 
in making the death penalty mandatory. Section 14-17 now reads 
as follows: 
"Murder in the first and second degree defined; 
punishment. -- A murder which shall be perpetrated 
by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, 
starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, de-
liberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be 
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any 
arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other 
felony shall be deemed to be murder in the first degTee 
and shall be punished with death. All other kinds of 
murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree 
and shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than 
two years nor more than life imprisonment in the 
State's prison." 
It was under this statute that the petitioners, who committed 






The petitioners argue that the imposition of the death penalty 
under any circumstances is cruel and unusual punishment in viola-
tion of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. We reject this ar-
gument for the reasons stated today in Gregg v. Georgia, ante, pp. 
III 
North Carolina, unlike Florida, Georgia, and Texas, has 
responded to the Furman cases by making death the mandatory 
__§_/ 
sentence for all persons convicted of first degree murder. In 
ruling on the constitutionality of the sentences imposed on the pe-
titioners under the North Carolina statute, the Court now addresses 
for the first time the question whether a death sentence returned 
pursuant to a statute imposing a mandatory death penalty for a 
7/ 
broad category of homicidal offenses- constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
~/ 
Amendments. The issue, lik.e that explored in Furman, involves 
the procedure employed by the state to select persons for the unique 
9/ 





The Eighth Amendment .e~att8s i8 assure that the State's 
1\ 
power to punish is "exercised within the limits of civilized society." 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion). See 
id., at 1 01; VVeems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373, 378 (191 0); 
Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 468-469 (1947) 
10/ 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring);- Robinson v. California, 370 
U.S. 660, 666 (1962); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 269-270 (Brennaq J., concurring); 
_id., at329 (Marshall, J., concurring); id., at382-383 (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting); id., at 408 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id., at 
428-429 (Powell, J., dissenting). Central to the application of the 
Amendment is a determination of contemporary standards regarding 
the infliction of punishment. ~Important indicia of societal values 
11 I 
identified in prior opinions include jury determinations, legis-
121 13 I 
lative enactments,- traditional usage,- and other measure-
141 
ments of public opinion. 
In order to provide a frame for the assessment of these 
~ ~ factors, we may begin by sketching the history of mandatory death 
·~ penalty statutes in the United States. At the time the Eighth Amend-





law practice of making death the exclusive and mandatory sentence 
15 I 
for certain specified offenses.- Although the range of capital of-
fenses in the American colonies was quite limited in comparison to 
the more than 200 offenses then punishable by death in England, 
the colonies at the time of the Revolution imposed death sentences 
on all persons convicted of any of a considerable number of crimes, 
typically including at a minimum, murder, treason, piracy, arson, 
161 
rape, robbery, burglary, and sodomy.-- As at common law, all 
homicides that were not involuntary, provoked, justified, or excused 
17 I 
constituted murder and were automatically punished by death. 
Almost from the outset jurors reacted unfavorably to the harshness 
18 I 
of mandatory death sentences.- The States initially responded 
to this expression of public dissatisfaction with mandatory statutes 
by limiting the classes of capit<1;l offenses. Ohio, in 1788, was the 
first jurisdiction to restrict the death penalty to persons convicted 
~I 
of murder. 
The Ohio reform, however, left unresolved the problem posed 
by the not infrequent refusal of juries to convict murderers rather 
than subject them to automatic death sentences. In 1794, Pennsyl-
vania attempted to alleviate the undue severity of the law by confining 
·.c 
75-5491, Woodsr· 
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the mandatory death penalty to "murder of the first degree" encom-
passing all "willful, deliberate and premeditated" killings. Pa. Laws 
20/ 
1794 c. 1777. Other jurisdictions, including Virginia and Ohio, 
soon enacted similar measures, and within a generation the practice 
21/ 
spread to most of the states. 
Despite the broad acceptance of the division of murder into 
degrees, the reform proved to be an unsatisfactory means of iden-
tifying persons appropriately punishable by death. Although its failure 
was due in part to the amorphous nature of the controlling concepts 
22/ 
of willfulness, deliberateness, and premeditation, a more funda-
mental weakness of the reform soon became apparent. Juries continued 
to find the death penalty inappropriate in a significant number of 
first degree murder cases and refused to return guilty verdicts for 
23 I 
that crime. 
The inadequacy of distinguishing between murders solely on 
the basis of legislative criteria narrowing the definition of the capital 
offense led the states to grant juries sentencing discretion in capital 
cases. Tennessee in 1838, followed by Alabama in 1841, and Louisi-
ana in 1846, were the first states to abandon mandatory death sen-
24/ 
tences in favor of discretionary death penalty statues.- The pro-
cedure enabled the juries to consider both the circumstances surround-




whether to impose the death penalty in a given case. This flexibility 
remedied the harshness of mandatory statutes by permitting the jury 
to respond to mitigating factors by withholding the death penalty. 
By the turn of the century, 23 states and the federal government 
had made death sentences discretionary for first degree murder 
and other capital offenses. During the next two decades 14 additional 
states replaced their mandatory death penalty statutes. ~Y 
the end of World War I, all but eight states, Hawaii, and the District 
of Columbia had either adopted discretionary death penalty schemes 
or abolished the death penalty altogether. By 1963, all of these 
remaining jurisdictions had replaced their automatic death penalty 
~/ 
statutes with discretionary jury sentencing. 
The history of mandatory death penalty statutes in the United 
States thus reveals that the practice of sentencing to death all persons 
-convicted of a particular offense has been rejected as unduly harsh 
and unworkably rigid. The two crucial indicators of evolving standards 
of decency respecting the imposition of punishment in our society --
jury determinations and legislative enactments -- both point conclu-
sively to the repudiation of automatic death sentences. At least since 




their oaths and refused to convict defendants where a 
death sentence was the automatic consequence of a guilty verdict. 
As we have seen, the initial movement to reduce the number of 
capital offenses and to separate murder into degrees was prompted 
in part by the reaction of jurors as well as by reformers who objected 
to the imposition of death as the penalty for any crime. Nineteenth 
century journalists, statesmen, and jurists repeatedly observed 
that jurors were often deterred from convicting palpably guilty men 
~I 
of first degree murder under mandatory statutes. Thereafter, 
continuing evidence of jury reluctance to convict persons of capital 
offenses in mandatory death penalty jurisdictions resulted in legis-
lative authorization of discretionary jury sentencing -- by Congress 
27 I 28 I 
for federal crimes in 1897,- by North Carolina in 1949,- and 
291 
by Congress for the District...of Columbia in 1962. 
As we have noted today in Gregg v. Georgia, ante at __ , 
legislative measures adopted. by the people's chosen representatives 
weigh heavily in ascertaining contemporary standards of decency. 
The consistent course charted by the state legislatures and by 
Congress since the middle of the past century demonstrates that the a-
version of jurors for mandatory death penalty statutes is shared by 
_lQ/ 
society at large. 
75-5491, Woodst:-. 
- 12 -
Still further evidence of the incompatibility of mandatory 
death penalties with contemporary values is provided by the results 
of jury sentencing under discretionary statutes. In Wither spoon v. 
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), the Court observed that "one of the 
most important functions any jury can perform" in exercising its 
discretion to choose "between life imprisonment and capital punish-
ment" is "to maintain a link between contemporary community values 
and the penal system." Id., at 519 and n. 15. Various studies in-
dicate that even in first degree murder cases juries with sentencing 
discretion do not impose the death penalty "with any great frequency." 
31/ 
H. Kalven and H. Zeisel, The American Jury 436 (1966).-
The actions of sentencing juries suggest that under contemporary 
standards of decency death is viewed as an inappropriate punishment 
for a substantial portion of convicted first degree murderers. 
Although the Court has never ruled on the constitutionality 
of mandatory death penalty statutes, on several occasions dating 
back to 1899 it has commented upon our society's aversion to auto-
matic death sentences. In Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 3 03 
(1899 ), the Court noted that the "hardship of punishing with death 




and the reluctance of jurors to concur in a capital conviction have 
induced American legislatures, in modern times, to allow some 
32/ 
cases of murder to be punished by imprisonment instead of by death."-
Fifty years after Winston, the Court underscored the marked trans-
formation in our attitudes towards mandatory sentences: "The be-
lief no longer prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls 
for an identical punishment without regard to the past life and habit s 
of a particular offender. This whole country has traveled far from 
the period in which the death sentence was an automatic and common-
place result of convictions .... " Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 
241, 247 (1949). 
More recently, the Court in McGautha v. California, 402 
U.S. 183 (1971 ), detailed the evolution of discretionary imposition 
of death sentences in this country, prompted by what it termed the 
American "rebellion against the common-law rule imposing a man-
datory death sentence on all convicted murderers." Id., at 198. 
See id., at 198-202. Perhaps the one important factor about evolving 
social values regarding capital punishment upon which the members 
of the Furmal1 _S:;ourt agreed was the accuracy of McGautha' s assess-
ment of our nation's rejection of mandatory death sentences. See 
75-5491, Woodsl-
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Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 245-246 (Douglas, J., concurring); 
id., at 297-298 (Brennan, J., concurring); id., at 339 (Marshall, 
J., concurring); id., at 402-403 (Burger, C.J., with whom Black-
mun, Powell, and Rehnquist, J. J., joined, dissenting); id., at 413 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Blackmun, for example, 
emphasized that legislation requiring an automatic death sentence 
for specified crimes would be "regressive and of an antique mold" 
and would mark a return to a "point in our criminology [passed 
beyond] long ago." Id., at 413. The Chief Justice, speaking for the 
four dissenting justices in Furman, discussed the question of manda-
tory death sentences at some length: 
"I had thought that nothing was clearer in history, as we 
noted in McGautha one year ago, than the American ab-
horrence of 'the common-law rule imposing a mandatory 
death sentence on all convicted murderers.' 402 U.S., 
at 198. As the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Marshall 
shows, ante, at 339, the 19th century movement away 
from mandatory death sentences marked an enlightened 
introduction of flexibility into the sentencing process. It 
r ecognized that individual culpability is not always 
measured by the category of the crime committed. This 
change in sentencing practice was greeted by the Court as 
a humanizing development. See Winston v. United States, 
172 U.S. 3 03 (1899 ); cf. Calton v. Utah, 13 0 U.S. 83 (1889). 
See also Andres v. Ulill:ed States, 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)." 408 U.S., at 402. 
75-5491, Woods._ 
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Although it seems beyond dispute that, at the time of the 
Furman decision in 1972, mandatory death penalty statutes had been 
renounced by American juries and legislatures, there remains the 
question whether the mandatory statutes adopted by North Carolina 
and a number of other states following Furman evince a sudden re-
versal of societal values regarding the imposition of capital punish-
ment. In view of the persistent and unswerving legislative rejection 
of mandatory death penalty statutes beginning in 1838 and continuing 
33 I 
for more than 130 years until Furman, it seems evident that 
the post-Furman enactments reflect attempts by the States to retain 
the death penalty in a form consistent with the Constitution, rather 
34/ 
than a renewed societal acceptance of mandatory death sentencing. 
The fact that some states have adopted mandatory measures following 
Furma~ while others have legislated standards to guide jury 
discretion appears attributable to diverse readings of this Court's 
multi-opinioned decision in that case. 
A brief examination of the background of the current North 
Carolina statute serves to reaffirm our assessment of its limited 
utility as an indicator of contemporary values regarding mandatory 




death sentence on any person convicted of rape or first degree murder. 
That year, a study commission created by the state legislature 
recommended that juries be granted discretion to recommend life 
sentences in all capital cases: 
"We propose that a recommendation of mercy by the jury 
in a capital case automatically carry with it a life sentence. 
Only three other states now have the mandatory death penalty 
and we believe that its retention will be definitely harmful. 
Quite frequently juries refuse to convict for rape or first 
degree murder because, from all the circumstances, they 
do not believe the defendant, although guilty, should suffer 
death. The result is that verdicts are returned hardly in 
harmony with evidence. Our proposal is already in effect 
in respect to the crimes of burglary and arson. There is 
much testimony that it has proved beneficial in such cases. 
We think the law can now be broadened to include all 
capital crimes." 
Report of the Special Commission For the Improvement of the Ad-
ministration of Justice, Improving the Administration of Justice in 
North Carolina, Popular Government 13 (Jan. 1949). 
The 1949 session of the General Assembly of North Carolina 
adopted the proposed modifications of its rape and murder statutes. 
Although in subsequent years numerous bills were introduced in the 
legislature to further limit or abolish the death penalty in North 
Carolina, they were rejected as were two 1969 proposals to return 





Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 441, 194 S.E. 2d 19, 26 (opinion of the 
Court); 282 N.C., at 456-457, 194 S. E. 2d at 3 2-33 (Bobbitt, C. J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Soon after this Court's decision in Furman, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of the State ' s 
death penalty statutes and concluded that Furman required the 
severance of the 1949 proviso authorizing jury discretion but that 
"the remainder of the statute with death as the mandatory punishment . 
remains in full force and effect." State v. Waddell, 282 N.C., 
at444-445, 194S.E.2d, at . In1974, theNorthCarolinalegis-
lature followed the course previously found constitutional in Waddell 
and enacted a first degree murder provision identical to the manda-
tory statute in operation prior to the authorization of jury discretion. 
The State's brief in this case i·elates that the legislature sought to 
remove "all sentencing discretion [so that] there would be no success-
ful Furman based attack upon the North Carolina statute." 
It is now well established that the E ;ghth Amendment draws 
much of its meaning from "the evolving standards of decency that 
mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U. S., at 101 (plurality opinion). As the above discussion makes 




treatment of capital punishment has been the rejection of the common 
law practice of inexorably imposing a death sentence upon every 
person convicted of a specified offense. North Carolina's mandatory 
death penalty statute for first degree murder departs markedly from 
contemporary standards respecting the imposition of the unique 
and irretrievable punishment of death and thus cannot be applied 
consistently with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments' require-
ment that the State's power topunish "be exercised within the limits 
of civilized society." Id., at 100. 
B. 
A separate deficiency of North Carolina's mandatory death 
sentence statute is its failure to provide a constitutionally tolerable 
response to Furman's rejection of unbridled jury discretion in the 
imposition of capital sentences. Central to the limited holding in 
Furman was the conviction that the vesting of standardless sen-
tencing power in the jury violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 309-310 (Stewart, 
J., concurring) id., at 313 (VVhite, J., concurring); E. J~., at 
253-257 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also.!:_<!_., at 398-399 




remedied the inadequacies of the death penalty statutes held uncon-
stitutional in Furman by withdrawing all sentencing discretion from 
juries in capital cases. But when one considers the long and con-
sistent American experience with the death penalty in first degree 
murder cases, it becomes evident that mandatory statutes enacted 
in response to Furman have simply papered over the problem of un-
guided and unchecked jury discretion. 
As we have noted in Part III-A, supra, there is general 
agreement that American juries have persistently refused to con-
viet a significant portion of first degree murderers under mandatory 
death penalty statutes. A North Carolina study commission reported 
in 1949 that juries in that state "[q]uite frequently" were deterred 
from rendering guilty verdicts for first degree murder because of 
the enormity of the sentence automatically imposed. Moreover, as 
a matter of historic fact, juries operating under discretionary sen-
tencing statutes have consistently returned death sentences in only a 
35 I 
minority of first degree murder cases.-- In view of the historic 
record, it is only reasonable to assume that juries will continue to 
conclude that a substantial number of murderers should not receive 
death sentences and will be motivated to disregard their oaths and 
- 20-
exercise their power of nullification. North Carolina's mandatory 
death penalty statute provides no standards to guide the jury in its 
inevitable exercise of the power to determine which murderers shall 
live and which shall die. And there is no way under the North Caro-
lina law for the judiciary to check arbitrary and capricious exercise 
36/ 
of that power through a review of death sentences.- Instead of 
rationalizing the sentencing process, a mandatory scheme may 
well exacerbate the problem identified in Furman by resting the 
penalty determination on the particular jury's willingness to act 
lawlessly. While a mandatory death penalty statute may reasonably 
be expected to increase the number of persons sentenced to death, 
it does not fulfill Furman's basic requirement of replacing arbi-
trary and wanton jury discretion with objective standards to guide, 
regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing 
a sentence of death. 
c. 
A third constitutional shortcoming of the North Carolina 
statute is its failure to allow the particularized consideration of 
relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted de-
fendant before the imposition upon him of a sentence of death. In 




denied -- that death is a punishment different from all other sanctions 
in kind rather than degree. See 408 U.S., at 286-291 (Brennan, J., 
concurring); id., at 3 06 (Stewart, J., concurring). A process that 
accords no significance to relevant facets of the character and 
record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the par-
ticular offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punish-
ment of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors 
stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. It treats all 
persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual 
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass 
to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death. 
This Court has previously recognized that "[f]or the deter-
mination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of 
more than the particular acts by which the crime was committed 
and that there be taken into account the circumstances of the offense 
together with the character and propensities of the offender." 
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 46, 51 (1937). Consideration of 
both the offender and the offense in order to arrive at a just and 
appropriate sentence has been viewed as a progressive and humanizing 
development. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-249 
,. . 
' 
(1949); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 402-403 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). While the prevailing practice of individualizing sen-
tencing determinations generally reflects simply enlightened policy 
rather than a constitutional imperative, we believe that in capital 
cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth 
Amendment, see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S., at 100 (plurality opinion), 
requires that consideration of the character and record of the in-
dividual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense 
be a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting 
the penalty of death. 
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the death sentences 
imposed upon the petitioners under North Carolina's mandatory death 
sentence statute violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments 
37 I 
and therefore must be set aside. The judgment of the North 
Carolina Supreme Court is reversed insofar as it upheld the death 
sentences imposed upon the petitioners, and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered . 
. J: 
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FOOTNOTES 
This charge arose from the wounding of the customer. 
2/ 
- Tucker was allowed to plead guilty to charges of accessory 
after the fact to murder and to armed robbery. He was senteneed 
to 10 years imprisonment on the first charge, and to not less than 
20 nor more than 30 on the second. The sentences are to run con-
currently. 
3/ 
- The Solicitor gave no reason for refusing to accept 
Waxton' s offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense. However, the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina, in finding that the Solicitor did 
not abuse his discretion, noted: 
"The evidence that Waxton planned and directed the 
robbery and that he fired the shots which killed Mrs. 
Butler and wounded Mr. Stancil is overwhelming. 
No extenuating circumstances gave the solicitor any 
incentive to accept the plea he tendered at the close 
of the State's evidence. 
* * * * 
"Finally, we note that Vvaxton and Woodson were adults, 
aged 24 and 23 respectively; Tucker and Carroll were 
still in their teens, aged 18 and 19 respectively." State 
v. Woodson and Waxton, 287 N.C. 578, 595-596; 215 S.E. 
2d 607, {1975). 
., o-::r':I:SI, woo son 
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4/ 
- The murder statute in effect in North Carolina until 
1973 read as follows: 
"§ 14-17. Murder in the first and second degree defined; 
punishment. -- A murder which shall be perpetrated by 
means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, 
torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and 
premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the 
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, 
robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed 
to be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with 
death: Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict in 
open court, the jury shall so recommend, the punishment 
shall be imprisonment for life in the State's prison, and the 
court shall so instruct the jury. All other kinds of murder 
shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall 
be punished with imprisonment of not less than two nor 
more than thirty years in the State's prison." N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-17 (1969 repl. volume). 
5/ 
-The Court characterized the effect of the statute without 
the defective sections as follows: 
"Upon the return of a verdict of guilty of any such offense, 
the court must impose a sentence of death. The punishment 
to be imposed for these capital felonies is no longer a dis-
cretionary question for the jury and therefore no longer a 
proper subject for an instruction by the judge." 282 N.C. 
at 445. 
6/ 
-See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1974), set 
forth in Part I supra. North Carolina has also enacted a mandatory 
death sentence statute for the crime of first degree rape. N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-21 (Cum. Supp. 1974). 
FN-3 
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This case does not involve a mandatory death penalty 
statute limited to an extremely narrow category of homicide, such 
as murder by a prisoner serving a life sentence, defined in large 
part in terms of the character or record of the offender. We thus 
express no opinion regarding the constitutionality of such a statute. 
See note 25 infra. 
8/ 
- The Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and 
unusual punishment has been held to be applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. California, 
370 u.s. 660 (1962). 
The Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238 (1972), involved statutes providing for jury discretion in the 
imposition of death sentences, Several members of the Court in 
Furman expressly declined to state their views regarding the con-
stitutionality of mandatory death sentence statutes. See id., at 257 
(Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 3 07 (Stewart, J., concurring); 
id., at 310-311 (White, J., concurring). 
!} 
The petitioners here, as in the other four death penalty 
cases before the Court, principally contend that their sentences were 
imposed in violation of the Constitution because North Carolina has 
,, 
.• 
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failed to eliminate discretion from all phases of its procedure for 
imposing capital punishment. We have rejected similar claims today 
in Gregg, Proffitt, and Jurek. In addition to these issues, however, 
the mandatory nature of the North Carolina death penalty statute for 
first degree murder presents further questions not emphasized by 
the petitioners. 
_!_Q_/ 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter contended that the Eighth 
Amendment did not apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. He believed, however, that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment itself "expresses a demand for civilized 
standards." Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S., 
at 468 (concurring opinion). 
11/ 
-See Witherspoon_v. Illino~, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n. 15 
(1968); McGau~ha v. California, · 402 U.S. 183, 201-202 (1971); Furman 
v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 3 00 (Brennan, J., concurring); id., at 
388 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id_., at 439-441 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
("Any attempt to discern, therefore, where prevailing standards of 
decency lie must take careful account of the jury's response to the 
question of capital punishment."): 
The actions of jurors faced with the actual decision whether 
or not to authorize the infliction of a specified punishment provides 
perhaps the most reliable measure of our society's attitude toward 
the imposition of the punishment. 
• ~ I 
FN-6 




See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 361 (Marshall, 
J., concurring) (public opinion polls); id., at 385-386 (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting) (public opinion polls); id., at 438-439 (Powell, 
J ., dissenting) (referenda). See also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 
u. s. 510, 520 (1968). 
15 I 
- See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America 28-29 
(rev. ed. 1967). 
16 I 
- See id., at 6; R. Bye, Capital Punishment in the United 
States 1-3 (1919) (Most New England colonies made 12 offenses 
capital. Rhode Island, with !0 capital crimes, was the "mildest 
of all of the colonies."); Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital 
Punishment, 284 Annals of the Amer. Academy 8, 10 (1952) (''The 
English colonies in this county had from ten to eighteen capital of-




- See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, 
at 23-24. 
181 
See id., at 27; Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion 
in Capital Cases, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1102 (1953); Mackey, 
The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note, 
54B.U.L. Rev. 32(1974); McGauthav. California, 402U.S. 183, 
198-199 (1971); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 
3 03' 31 0 ( 18 9 9) . 
19 I 
- SeeR. Bye, Capital Punishment in the United States, 
supra, at 5. During the colonial period, Pennsylvania under the 
Great Law of William Penn limited capital punishment to murder 
in 1682. Following Penn's death in 1718, however, Pennsylvania 
greatly expanded the number of capital offe\ses. See Hartung, Trends 
in the Use of Capital Punishment, supra, at 9-10. 
Many States during the early 19th century significantly re-
duced the number of crimes punishable by death. See Davis, The 
Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America, 1787-1861, 
63 Amer. Hist. Rev. 23, 27 & n. 15 (1957) (the author provides 









- See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, 
at 23-24. 
181 
See id., at 27; Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion 
in Capital Cases, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1102 (1953); Mackey, 
The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note, 
54 B.U.L. Rev. 32 (1974); McGauthav. California, 402 U.S. 183, 
198-199 (1971); Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Winston v. United States, 172 U.S. 
3 03' 31 0 ( 18 9 9) . 
19 I 
- SeeR. Bye, Capital Punishment in the United States, 
supra, at 5. During the colonial period, Pennsylvania under the 
Great Law of William Penn limited capital punishment to murder 
in 1682. Following Penn's death in 1718, however, Pennsylvania 
greatly expanded the number of capital offe\ses. See Hartung, Trends 
in the Use of Capital Punishment, supra, at 9-10. 
Many States during the early 19th century significantly re-
duced the number of crimes punishable by death. See Davis, The 
Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America, 1787-1861, 
63 Amer. Hist. Rev. 23, 27 & n. 15 (1957) (the author provides 
later dates for the reform in Ohio). 
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20/ 
- See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, 
at 24. 
21/ 
- See ibid.; Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capital 
Punishment in America, 1787-1861, supra, at 26-27 n. 13. By the 
late 1950s, some 34 states had adopted the Pennsylvania formulation, 
and only 10 states retained a single category of murder as defined 
at, common law. See Model Penal Code § 201. 6, Comment 2, p. 
66 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). 
22/ 
- See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 198-199 
(1971). 
23 I 
See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, 
at 27; Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An 
Historical Note, supra; McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 
(1971). 
24/ 
See Tenn. Laws 1837-1838, c. 29; Ala. Laws 1841; 
La. Laws 1846, c. 139. See also W. Bowers, Executions in 
America, supra, at 7. 
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Prior to the Tennessee reform in 1838, Maryland had changed 
from a mandatory to an optional death sentence for the crimes of 
treason, rape, and arson. Md. Laws 1809, ch. 138. For a time 
during the early colonial period Massachusetts, as part of its 
Capitan Lawes of 1636, had a nonmandatory provision for the crime 
of rape. See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty, supra, at 28. 
25/ 
- See W. Bowers, Executions in America 7-9 (1974) 
(Table 1-2 sets forth the date each state adopted discretionary jury 
sentencing); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in McGautha 
v. California, No. 70-203, App. C (listing the state statutes in force 
in 1970 providing for discretionary jury sentencing in capital murder 
cases). 
Prior to this Court's 19'72 decision in Furman v. Georgia, 
408 U.S. 238, there remained a handful of obscure statutes scattered 
among the penal codes of various states that required an automatic 
death sentence upon conviction of a specified offense. These statutes 
applied to such esoteric crimes as trainwrecking resulting in death, 
perjury in a capital case resulting in the execution of an innocent 
person, and treason against a state government. See H. Bedau, 
The Death Penalty in America, supra, at 46-47 (1964 compilation). 
The most prevalent of these statutes dealt with the crime of treason 
.: .. ·. 
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against state governments. See id., at 47. It appears that no one 
has ever been prosecuted under these or other state treason laws. 
See Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, supra, at 
10. See also T. Sellin, The Death Penalty: A Report for the Model 
Penal Code Project of the American Law Institute 1 (1959) (discussing 
the Michigan statute, subsequently repealed in 1963, and the North 
Dakota statute). Several States retained mandatory death sentences 
for perjury in capital cases resulting in the execution of an innocent 
person. Data covering the years from 1930 to 1961 indicate, how-
ever, that no State employed its capital perjury statute during that 
period. See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, at 
46. 
The only category of mandatory death sentence statute that 
appears to have had any relev:ance to the actual administration of 
the death penalty in the years preceeding Furman concerned the 
crimes of murder or assault with a deadly weapon by a life term 
prisoner. Statutes of this type apparently existed in 5 states in 1964. 
See id., at 46-47. In 1970, only 5 of the more than 550 prisoners 
under death sentence across the country had been sentenced under 
a mandatory death penalty statute. Those prisoners had all been 
convicted under the California statute applicable to assaults by life 
term prisoners. See Brief of the NAACP as Amicus Curiae in McGautha 
v. California, No. 70-203, at 15 n. 19. We have no occasion in this 
75-5491, Wood~ . 
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case to examine the constitutionality of mandatory death sentence 
statutes applicable to prisoners serving life sentences. 
26/ 
- See Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punish-
ment: An Historical Note, supra. 
27 I 
-See H.R. Rep. No. 108, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. (1896) 
(The report noted that the modification of the federal capital statutes 
to make the death penalty discretionary was in harmony with "a grow-
ing public sentiment." Id., at 2, quoting H.R. No. 545, 53d Cong., 
2d Sess. 1 (1894) ); S. Rep. No. 846, 53d Cong., 3d Sess. (1895 ). 
28/ 
- See Report of the Special Commission for the Improve-
ment of the Administration of Justice, Improving the Administration 
of Justice in North Carolina, Popular Government 13 (Jan. 1949). 
29/ ~ 
- . See Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Judiciary 
of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia 19-20 (May 17, 
1961) (testimony of Senator Keating). Data compiled by a former 
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia indicated that 
juries convicted defendants of first degree murder in only 12 of the 
75-5491, Woodson 
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60 jury trials for first degree murder held in the District 
of Columbia between July 1, 1953 and February, 1960. Id., at 19 . 
The conviction rate was "substantially below the general average 
in prosecuting other crimes." Id., at 20. The lower conviction 
rate was attributed to the reluctance of jurors to impose the harsh 
consequences of a first degree murder conviction in cases where the 
record might justify a lesser punishment. Ibid. See McCafferty, 
Major Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 1 Crim. L .Q. 9, 
14-15 (1963) (discussing a similar study of first degree murder 
cases in the District of Columbia during the period July 1, 1947, 
through June 30, 1958). 
A study of the death penalty submitted to the American Law 
Institute noted that juries in Massachusetts and Connecticut had 
"for many years" resorted to second degree murder convictions 
to avoid ihe consequences of those states' mandatory death penalty 
~ ~~~ sla:kdcs 
statutes for first degree murder, prior to the~replacement with 
1\ 
discretionary sentencing in 1951. See T. Sellin, The Death Penalty: 
A Report to the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law 
Institute 13 (1959). 
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A 1973 Pennsylvania legislative report surveying the avail-
able literature analyzing mandatory and discretionary death sen-
tence statutes concluded: 
"Although the data collection techniques in some in-
stances are weak, the uniformity of the conclusions in 
substantiating what these authors' termed 'jury nullifi-
cation' (i.e. refusal to convict because of the required 
penalty) is impressive. Authors on both sides of the 
capital punishment debate reached essentially the same 
conclusions. Authors writing about the mandatory death 
penalty who wrote in 1892 reached the same conclusions 
as persons writing in the 1950's and 1960's." 
McCloskey, A Review of the Literature Contrasting Mandatory and 
Discretionary Systems of Sentencing Capital Cases, Pa. GSCCP 
Report No. 2, published in Report of the Governor's Study Commission 
on Capital Punishment 101 (Sept. 1973). 
30/ 
- Not only have ll!_andatory death sentence laws for murder 
been abandoned by legislature after legislature since Tennessee re-
placed its mandatory statute 138 years ago, but, with a single ex-
ception, no State prior to this Court's Furman decision in 1972 ever 
returned to a mandatory scheme after adopting discretionary sentencing. 
See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, at 3 0; W. 
Bowers, Executions in America, supra, at 9. Vermont, which first 
provided for jury discretion in 1911, was apparently prompted to 
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return to mandatory sentencing by a "veritable crime wavp of twenty 
murders" in 1912. See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, 
supra, at 30. Vermont reinstituted discretionary jury sentencing 
in 1957. 
31/ 
-- Data compiled on discretionary jury sentencing of 
persons convicted of capital murder reveal that the penalty of death 
is generally imposed in less than 20% of the cases. See Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 386-387 n. 11 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing); id., at 435-436 n. 19 (Powell, J., dissenting); Brief for the 
Petitioner in Aikens v. California, No. 68-5027, at App. F 
(collecting data from a number of jurisdictions indicating that the 
percentage of death sentences in many states was well below 2{'%). 
Statistics compiled by the Department of Justice show that only 66 
convicted murderers were sentenced to death in 1972. See Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration, Capital Punishment, 1971-
1972 (National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin Dec. 1974) (Table 7a). 
_g/ 
Later, in Andres v. United States, Justice Frankfurter 
observed that the 19th century movement leading to the passage of 
legislation providing for discretionary sentencing in capital cases 
·.~~ ... 
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"was impelled both by ethical and humanitarian arguments ag-ainst 
capital punishment, as well as by the practical consideration that 
jurors were reluctant to bring in verdicts which inevitably called 
for its infliction." 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948) (concurring opinion). 
See note 3 0, supra. 
34 I 
-A study of public opinion polls on the death penalty 
concluded that "despite the increasing approval for the death penalty 
reflected in opinion polls during the last decade, there is evidence 
that many people supporting the general idea of capital punishment 
want its administration to depend on the circumstances of the case, 
the character of the defendant, or both." Vidmar and Ellsworth, 
Public Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1245, 1267 
(1974). One poll discussed by the authors revealed that a "substantial 
majority" of persons opposed mandatory capital punishment. Id., at 
1253. Moreover, the public through the jury system has in recent 
years applied the death penalty in anything but a mandatory fashion. 
See note 31, supra. 
35/ 
- See note 31 supra. 
3~ 
See Gregg v. Georgia, 
.. ,, . 




Our determination that the death sentences in this 
case were imposed under procedures that violated constitutional 
standards makes it unnecessary to reach the question whether im-
position of the death penalty on petitioner Woodson would have been 
so disporportionate in comparison to the nature of his involvement 
in the capital offense as independently to violate the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. See Gregg v. Georgia, __ U.S. --' 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
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Mr. Justice White 
Mr . Justice Marshall 
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On Writ of certiorari to the Supreme court of North Carol~na 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. 
I. 
The difficulties which attend the plurality•s explanation 
for the result it reaches tend at first to obscure difficulties 
at least as significant which inhere in the unarticulated 
premises which necessarily underlie that explanation. I 
advert to the latter only briefly, in order to devote the 
major and following portion of this dissent to those issues 
which the plurality actually considers. 
As an original proposition, it is by no means clear 
that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments 
embodied in the Eighth Amendment, and made applicable to 
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, Robinson v. 
California, 370 u.s. 660 (1962) was not limited to those 
punishments deemed cruel and unusual at the time of the 
adoption of the Bill of Rights. McGautha v. California, 
402 u.s. 183, 225 (1971) (Black, J. concurring). If 
- 2 -
Weems v. United States, 217 u.s. 349 (1910), dealing not 
with the Eighth Amendment but with an identical provision 
contained in the Philippine Constitution, and the plurality 
opinion in Trop v. Dulles, 356 u.s. 86 (1958), are to be 
taken as indicating the contrary, they should surely be 
weighed against statements in cases such as Wilkerson v. 
Utah, 99 u.s. 130 (1879); In re Kernrnler, 136 u.s. 436 
(1890); Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 329 u.s. 
459, 464 (1947); and the plurality opinion in Trop itself, 
that the infliction of capital punishment is not in itself 
violative of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. 
Thus for the plurality to begin its analysis with the 
assumption that it need only demonstrate that "evolving 
standards of dec~ncy" show that contemporary "society" has 
rejected such provisions is itself a somewhat shaky point 
of departure. But even if the assumption be conceded, the 
plurality opinion's analysis nonetheless founders. 
The plurality relies first upon its conclusion that 
society has turned away from the mandatory imposition of 
death sentences, and second upon its conclusion that the 
North Carolina system has "simply papered over" the problem 
of unbridled jury discretion which two of the separate 
- 3 -
opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 u.s. 238 (1972) identified 
as the basis for the judgment rendering the death sentences 
there reviewed unconstitutional. The third "constitutional 
shortcoming" of the North Carolina statute is said to be 
"its failure to allow the particularized consideration of 
relevant aspects of the character and record of each convict-
ed defendant before the imposition upon him of the sentence 
of death." Ante at 20. 
I do not believe that any one of these reasons singly, 
nor all of them together, can withstand careful analysis. 
Contrary to the plurality's assertions they would import 
into the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause procedural 
requirements which find no support in our cases. Their 
application will result in the invalidation of a death 
sentence imposed upon a defendant convicted of first degree 
murder under the North Carolina system, and the upholding 
of the same sentence imposed on an identical defendant 
convicted on identical evidence of first degree murder 
under the Florida, Georgia, and Texas discretionary system 
a result surely as "freakish" as that condemneu in the 





The plurality is simply mistaken in its assertion that 
"[t]he history of mandatory death penalty statutes in the 
United States thus reveals that the practice of sentencing 
to death all persons convicted of a parti:cular offense have 
been rejected as unduly harsh and unworkably rigid." Ante, 
at 10. This conclusion is purportedly based on two historic 
developments: the first a series of legislative decisions 
during the nineteenth century narrowing the class of offenses 
punishable by death; the second a series of legislative 
decisions during both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
through which mandatory imposition of the death penalt y 
I 
largely gave way to jury discretion in deciding whether 
or not to impose this ultimate sanction. The first 
development may have some relevance to the plurality's 
argument in general but has no bearing at all upon this 
case. The second development, properly analyzed, has 
virtually no relevance even to the plurality's argument. 
There can be no question that the legislative and 
other materials discussed in the plurality's opinion show 
a widespread conclusion on the part of. state legislatures 
during the nineteenth century that the penalty of death 
- 5 -
was being required for too broad a range of crimes, and 
that these legislatures proceeded to narrow the range of 
crimes for which such penalty could be imposed. If this 
case involved the imposition of the death penalty for an 
offense such as burglary or sodomy, see ante, at 8, the 
virtually unanimous trend in the legislatures of the 
States to exclude such offenders from liability for 
capital punishment might bear on the Court•s Eighth Amend-
ment argument. But petitioners were convicted of first 
degree murder, and there is not the slightest suggestion 
in the material relied upon by the court that there had 
been any turning away at all, much less any such unanimous 
turning away, from the death penalty as a punishment for 
those guilty of first degree murder. The legislative 
narrowing of the spectrum of capital crimes, therefore, 
while very arguably representing a general societal 
judgment since the trend was so widespread, simply never 
reached far enough to exclude the sort of aggravated 
homicide of which petitioners stand convicted. 
The second string to the plurality•s analytical bow 
is that legislative change from mandatory to discretionary 
imposition of the death sentence likewise evidences societal 
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rejection of mandatory death penalties. The plurality simply 
does not make out this part of its case, however, in large 
part because it treats as being of equal dignity with 
legislative judgments the judgments of particular juries and 
of individual jurors. 
There was undoubted dissatisfaction, from more than one 
sector of nineteenth century society, with the operation of 
mandatory death sentences. One segment of that society was 
totally opposed to capital punishment, and was apparently 
willing to accept the substitution of discretionary 
imposition of that penalty for its mandatory imposition 
as a halfway house on the road to total abolition. Another 
segment was equally unhappy with the operation of the 
mandatory system, but for an entirely different reason. 
As the plurality recognizes, this second segment of society 
was unhappy with the operation of the mandatory system, not 
because of the death sentences imposed under it, but because 
people obviously guilty of criminal offenses were not 
being convicted under it. See ante, at 11. Change to a 
discretionary system was accepted by these persons not 
because they thought mandatory imposition of the death 
penalty was cruel and unusual, but because they thought 
that if jurors were permitted to return a sentence other 
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than death upon the conviction of a capital crime, fewer 
guilty defendants would 
supra, 402 u.s., at 199. 
be acquitted. See McGautha, 
So far as the action of juries is concerned, the fact 
that in some cases juries operating under the mandatory 
system refused to convict obviously guilty defendants does 
not reflect any "turning away" from the death penalty, or 
the mandatory death penalty, supporting the proposition 
that it is "cruel and unusual". Given the requirement of 
unanimity with respect to jury verdicts in capital cases, 
a requirement which prevails today in States which accept 
a non-unanimous verdict in the case of other crimes, see 
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363-364 (1972), it is 
apparent that a single juror could prevent a jury from 
returning a verdict of conviction. Occasional refusals to 
convict, therefore, may just as easily have represented the 
intransigence of only a small minority of twelve jurors as 
well as the unanimous judgment of all twelve. The fact that 
the presence of such jurors could prevent conviction in a 
given case, even though the majority of society, speaking 
through the legislature, had decreed that it should be 
imposed, certainly does not indicate that society as a whole 
rejected mandatory punishment for such offenders; it does 
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not even indicate that those few members of society who 
serve on juries, as a whole, had done so. 
The introduction of discretionary sentencing likewise 
creates no inference that contemporary society had rejected 
the mandatory system as unduLy se~:re.~ 
No ~b - - ----- ·- ... 
~ ~gislatures enacting discretionary sentencing statutes 
had no reason to think that there would not be roughly the 
same number of capital convictions under the new system as 
under the old. The same subjective juror responses which 
resulted in juror nullification under the old system were 
legitimized, but in the absence of those subjective 
responses to a particular set of facts, a capital sentence 
could as likely be anticipated under the discretionary 
system as under the mandatory. And at least some of those 
who would have been acquitted under the mandatory system 
would be subjected to at least some punishment under the 
discretionary system, rather than escaping altogether a 
penalty for the crime of which they were guilty. That 
society was unwilling to accept the paradox presented to 
it by the actions of some maverick juries or jurors --
the acquittal of palpably guilty defendants -- hardly 
reflects the sort of an "evolving standard of decency" 
to which the plurality professes obeisance. 
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Nor do the opinions in Furman which indicate a preference 
for discretionary sentencing in capital cases suggest in the 
slightest that a mandatory sentencing procedure would be 
cruel and unusual. The plurality concedes, as they must, 
that following Furman ten states enacted laws providing 
for mandatory capital punishment. See State Capital 
Punishment Statutes Enacted Subsequent to Furman v. Georgia, 
Congressional Research Service Pamphlet 17-22 (June 19, 1974). 
These enactments the plurality seeks to explain as due to a 
wrong-headed reading of the holding in Furman. But this 
explanation simply does not wash. While those States may 
be presumed to have preferred their prior systems reposing 
sentencing discretion in juries or judges, they indi5putably 
preferred mandatory capital punishment to no capital 
punishment at all. Their willingness to enact statutes 
providing that penalty is utterly inconsistent with the 
notion that they regarded mandatory capital sentencing as 
beyond "evolving standards of decency." The plurality's 
glib rejection of these legislative decisions as having 
little weight on the scale which it finds in U.e Eighth 
Amendment seems to me more an instance of their desire 
to save the people from themselves than a conscientious 




The second constitutional flaw which the plurality 
in North Carolina's mandatory system is that it has simply 
"papered over" the problem of unchecked jury discretion. 
The plurality states that, ante, at 19, "there is general 
agreement that American juries have persistently refused to 
convict a significant portion of first degree murderers 
under mandatory death penalty statutes. The plurality also 
states, ~, at 19, that "as a matter of historic fact, 
juries operating under discretionary sentencing statutes have 
consistently returned death sentences in only a minority of 
first degree murder cases." The basic factual assumption 
of the plurality seems to be that for any given number of 
first degree murder defendants subject to capital punishment, 
there will be a certain number of jurors who will be unwilling 
to impose the death penalty even though they are entirely 
satisfied that the necessary elements of the substantive 
offense are made out. 
For purposes of argument, I am willing to accept the 
plurality's hypothesis: but it seems to me impossible to 
conclude from it that a mandatory death sentence statute 
such as North Carolina enacted is any less sound consti-
. 
tutionality than are the discretionary standards enacted 
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by Texas, Florida, and Georgia which the Court upholds. 
For if the hypothesis is true as to the existence of 
jurors having a bent towards nullificat~on in a mandatory 
death penalty Stete such as North Carolina, there is no 
reason whatever to believe that like numbers of jurors so 
inclined do not exist also in Georgia, Florida, and Texas. 
This class of jurors, wherever they reside, will because 
of their own subjective responses to some aspect of the 
case presented to them simply decline to impose the death 
penalty even though all the stated standards for the 
imposition of that penalty have, in their judgment, been 
met. 
In North Carolina these jurors may simply hang a jury 
or they may impose their will sufficiently so that a verdict 
of not guilty is brought in; in Louisiana they will have a 
similar effect in causing some juries to bring in a verdict 
of guilty of a lesser included offense even though all the 
jurors are satisfied that the elements of the greater 
offense are made out. Such jurors, of course are violating 
their oath, but such violation is not only consistent with 
the majority's hypothesis, the majority 1 s hypothesis is 
bottomed on its occurrence. 
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But what will be the effect of the presence of these 
jurors on juries in Florida, Georgia, and Texas 3 States 
which have a so-called "discretionary" system of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances for determining whether or not 
to impose the death penalty? In those states, these 
hypothetical "maverick" jurors will just as surely respond 
to their peculiar notions of when capital punishment should 
not be imposed aa will their counterparts in North Carolina 
and Louisiana. Even though convinced that circumstances 
specified by the legislature are present in a particular case, 
if they nonetheless choose not to impose the death penalty 
in that case, they will decline to find those circumstances 
present. The result is just as surely a form of jury nul-
lification in the discretionary States as it would be in 
the mandatory States. Only if the legislature has, by 
enacting a list of generalizations entitled aggravating or 
mitigating circumstances, anticipated precisely the foibles 
of these particular jurors, will there be no jury nul-
lification in the discretionary States. And if that be the 
result, the legislative effort to specify "aggr;J,vating" and 
"mitigating" circumstances proves to be much ado about 
nothing. It amounts simply to meaningless advance 
ratification by the legislature of exercises by juries of 
subjective notions as to how mercy should be dispensed. 
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The plurality opinion must rest therefore upon the 
unstated assumption that jurors and courts will somehow 
be guided by legislatively enacted discretionary standards, 
but will not be guided by legislatively enacted mandatory 
standards. That the plurality does not expressly embrace 
such a dubious assumption is quite understandable because 
no reliable empirical evidence is available to support i t. 
In my view there will undoubtedly be elements of juror 
nullification present in any given number of a class of 
capital cases; thAre will certainly be no more under a 
mandatory system than under a discretionary system unless 
the latter is frankly structured so as to ratify in 
advance the subjective notions of jurors which would 
otherwise lead to juror nullification. 
The plurality seems to believe, see ante at 20, that 
provision for appellate review will afford a check upon 
the instances of juror nullification in a discretionary 
system. But it is not at all apparent that appellate 
review of death sentences, through a process of comparing 
the facts of one case in which a death sentence was imposed 
with the facts of another in which such a sentence was 
imposed, will afford any meaningful protection against 
whatever arbitrariness results from jury discretion. All 
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that such review of death sentences can provide is a 
comparison of fact situations which must in their nature 
be highly particularized if not unique, and the only 
relief which it can afford is to single out the occasional 
death sentence which in the view of the reviewing court 
does not conform to the standards established by the 
legislature. Appellate review affords no correction 
whatever with respect to those fortunate few who are the 
beneficiaries of random discretion exercised by juries, 
whether under an admittedly discretionary system or under 
a purportedly mandatory system. It may make corrections 
at one end of the spectrum, but cannot at the other. It 
is even less clear that any provision of the Constitut ion 
can be read to require such appellate review. If the 
States wish to undertake such an effort, they a r e undoubtedly 
free to do so, but surely it is not required by the United 
States Constitution. 
The Court's insistence on "standards" to "guide the 
jury in its inevitable exercise of the power to decide 
which murderer shall live and which shall die" is squarely 
contrary to the Court's opinion in McGautha, supra, 
authored by Mr. Justice Harlan and subscribed to by five 
other members of the court only five years ago. So is the 
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court's latter-day recognition, some four years after the 
decision of the case, that Furman requires "objective 
standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally 
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." 
Its abandonment of stare decisis in this repudiation of 
McGautha is a far lesser mistake than its substitution of 
a superficial and contrived constitutional doctrine for 
the genuine wisdom contained in McGautha. There the court 
addressed the "standardless discretion" contention in this 
language: 
C·{In our view, such force as this argument has derives 
largely from its generality. Those who have come to 
grips with the hard task of actually attempting to draft 
means of channeling capital !Sentencing discretion have 
confirmed the lesson taught by the history recounted 
above. To identify before the fact those characteristics 
of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call 
for the death penalty, and to express these characteristics 
in language which can be fairly understood and applied 
by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which 
are beyond present human ability. 
Thus the British Home Office, which before the recent 
abolition of capital punishment in thst country had the 
responsibility for Selecting the cases from England and 
Wales which should receive the benefit of the Royal 
Prerogative of Mercy, observed: 
-IJ-The difficulty of defining by sny statutory pro-
vision the types of murder whieh ought or ought 
not to be punished by death IDBY be illustrated by 
reference to the many diverse coll5iderations to .which 
the Home Secretary has regard in deciding whether 
to recommend clemency. No simple formula can take 
account of the innumerable deg:-ees of culpability, 
and no formula which fails to do so can claim to 
be just or satisfy public opinion."'1-2 Royal Com-
mission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evi-
dence 13 '(1949). 11 402 u.s., at 204-205. 
* * * 
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\'Jn light of history, experience, and the pre'*:nt lim~ta­
tions of human knowledge, we find it quite. rmp~ssible 
to say that committing to the untrammeled d1s~retw~ of 
the jury the power to pronounce life or d~at~ m capital 
cases is offensive to anything in the ConstitutiOn. The 
States are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with 
the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death 
for a fellow human will act with due regard for the con-
sequences of their decision and will consider a variety 
of factors, many of which will have been suggested by 
the evidence or by the arguments of defense counsel. 
For a court to attempt to catalog the appropriate factors 
in this elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the 
scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances would 
ever be really complete. The infinite variety of cases 
and facets to each case. would make general standards 
either meaningless ~oiler-plate' ot ..a... statement otf ;l'~e,_208 
b 
. h . ld ed ,.,,;oq. U:l u.S. , a o vious t at no JUry wou ne . ' 
(citation omitted). 
It is also worth noting that the plurality opinion 
repudiates not only the view expressed by the court in 
McGautha, but also, as noted in McGautha, the view which 
had been adhered to by every other American jurisdiction 
which had considered the question. See 402 u.s. at 196 
n. a. 
IV. 
The plurality opinion's insistence, in Part III c, 
that if the death penalty is to be imposed there must be 
"particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the 
character and record of each convicted defendant" is 
buttressed by neither case authority nor reason. Its 
principal claim to distinction is that it contradicts 
important parts of Part III A in the same opinion • 
. . , 
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Part III A, which describes what it conceives to have 
been society's turning away from the mandatory imposition of 
the death penalty, purports to express no opinion as to the 
constitutionality of a mandatory statute for "an extremely 
narrow category of homicide, such as murder by a prisoner 
serving a life sentence." See ante at n. 7. Yet if 
"particularized consideration" is to be required in every 
case under the doctrine expressed in Part III c, such a 
reservation in Part III A is disingenous at best. 
The requirl3ment of "particularized consideration" in 
Part III C is, if consistent analysis still be thought 
relevant to doctrinal soundness, also fatally at odds with 
the major premise of Part III B of the plurality's opinion. 
Part III B denounces mandatory sentencing statutes b e cause, 
so the opinion says, the prevalence of juror nullification 
means that in practice even under mandatory statutes there 
will be subjective discretion exercised by jurors. Part 
III c, on the other hand, proceeds to denounce mandatory 
sentences because in theory, if not in practice, the jurors 
are not allowed to exercise any discretion in deciding 
whether the sentence should be imposed once they have 
determined that the defendant committed the offense in 
question. 
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None of the cases half-heartedly cited by the plurality 
in Part III c comes within a light year of establishing the 
proposition that individualized consideration is a consti-
tutional requisite for the imposition of the death penalty. 
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 u.s. 51 (1937), upheld against a 
claim of violation of the Equal Protection Clause a 
Pennsylvania statute which made the sentence imposed upon 
a convict breaking out of a penitentiary dependent upon the 
length of the term which he was serving at the time of the 
break. In support of its conclusion that Pennsylvania had 
not denied the convict equal protection, the court observed: 
"The comparative gravity of criminal 
offenses and whether their consequences 
are more or less injurious are matters 
for [the State•s] determination •••• 
It may inflict a deserved penalty merely 
to vindicate the law or to deter or to 
reform the offender or for all of these 
purposes. For the determination of sentences, 
justice generally requires consideration of 
more than the particular acts by which the 
crime was committed and that there be taken 
into account the circumstances of the offense 
together with the character and propensities 
of the offender. His past may be taken to 
indicate his present purposes and tendencies 
and significantly to suggest the period of 
restraint and the kind of disciplinb that 
ought to be imposed upon him." 302 u.s., at 
55. 
These words of Mr. Justice Butler, speaking for the 
court in that case, and those of Mr. Justice Black in 
Williams v. New York, 337 u.s. 241 (1949), the other opinion 
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relied on by the plurality, lend no support whatever to 
the principle that the constitution requires individualized 
consideration. This is not surprising, since even if such 
a doctrine had respectable support, which it has not, it is 
unlikely that either Mr. Justice Butler or Mr. Justice Black 
would have embraced it. 
The plurality also relies upon the indisputable pro-
position that 11 death is different .. for the result which it 
reaches in Part III c. But the respects in which death is 
11 different 11 from other punishment which may be imposed upon 
convicted criminals do not seem to me to establish the 
proposition that the Constitution requires individualized 
sentencing. 
One of the principal reasons why death is different 
is because it is irreversible; an executed defendant 
cannot be brought back to life. This aspect of the 
difference between death and other penalties would un-
doubtedly support statutory provisions for especially 
careful review of the fairness of the trial, the accuracy 
of the fact-finding process, and the fairness of the 
sentencing procedure where the death penalty is imposed. 
But none of those aspects of the death sentence is at issue 
here. Petitioners were found guilty of the crime of first 
I,;OV -- ---
degree murder in a trial the constitutional validity of 
which is unquestioned here. And since the punishment of 
death is conceded by the plurality not to be a cruel and 
unusual punishment for such a crime, the irreversible 
aspect of the death penalty has no connection whatever 
with any requirement for individualized consideration of 
the sentence. 
The second aspect of the death penalty which makes it 
"different" from other penalties is the fact that it is 
indeed an ultimate penalty, which ends a human life rather 
than simply requiring that a living human being be confined 
for a given period of time in a penal institution. This 
aspect of the difference may enter into the decision of 
whether or not it is a "cruel and unusual" penalty for a 
given offense. But since in this case the offense was 
first degree murder, that particular inquiry need proceed 
no further. 
The plurality's insistence on individualized considera-
tion of the sentencing, therefore, depends not upon any 
traditional application of the prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment. 
The punishment here is concededly not cruel and unusual, 
and that determination has traditionally ended judicial 
- .<::.l. -
inquiry in our cases construing the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment Clause. Trop v. Dulles, supra; Robinson v. 
California, supra; Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 
supra; Wilkerson v. Utah, supra. What the plurality 
opinion has actually done ib to import into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment what it conceives to be 
desirable procedural guarantees where the punishment of 
death, concededly not cruel and unusual for the crime o f 
which the defendant was convicted, is to be imposed. This 
is squarely contrary to McGautha, and unsupported by any 
other decision of this court. 
I agree with the conclusion of the plurality, and with 
that of Mr. Justice White, that death is not a cruel and 
unusual punishment for the offense of which these petitioners 
were convicted. Since no member of the Court suggests that 
the trial which led to those convictions in any way fell 
short of the standards mandated by the Constitution, the 
judgments of conviction should be affirmed. The Fourteenth 
Amendment, giving the fullest scope to its "majestic 
generalities," Fay v. New York, 332 u.s. 261, 282 (1947), 
is conscripted rather than interpreted when used to permit 






The second constitutional flaw which the plurality finds 
in North Carolina's mandatory system is that it has simply 
"papered over" the problem of unchecked jury discretion. 
The plurality states that, ante, at 19, "there is general 
agreement that American juries have persistently refused to 
convict a significant portion of first degree murderers 
under mandatory death penalty statutes. The plurality also 
states, ante, at 19, that "as a matter of historic fact, 
juries operating under discretionary sentencing statutes have 
consistently returned death sentences in only a minority of 
first degree murder cases." The basic factual assumption 
. of the plurality seems to be that for any given number o£ 
first degree murder defendants subject to capital punishment, 
there will be a certain number of jurors who will be unwilling 
to impose the death penalty even though they are entirely 
satisfied that the necessary elements of the substantive 
offense are made out. 
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In North Carolina jurors unwilling to impose the death 
penalty may simply hang a jury or they may so assert them-
selves that a verdict of not guilty is brought in; in Louisiana 
they will have a similar effect in causing some juries to bring 
in a verdict of guilty of a lesser included offense even though 
all the jurors are satisfied that the elements of the greater 
offense are made out. Such jurors, of course)are violating 
their oath, but such violation is not only consistent with 
the majority's hypothesis: the majority's hypothesis is 
bottomed on its occurrence. 
For purposes of argument, I accept the plurality's 
hypothesis: but it seems to me impossible to conclude 
from it that a mandatory death sentence statute such as 
North Carolina enacted is any less sound constitutionally 
than are the systems enacted by Georgia, Florida, and Texas 
which the Court upholds. 
In Georgia juries are entitled to return a 
sentence of life, rather . than death, for no reason whatever, 
simply based upon their own subjective notions of what is 
right and what is wrong. In Florida the judge and jury are 
required to weigh legislatively enacted aggravating factors 
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against legislatively enacted mitigating factors, and then base 
their choice between life or death on an estimate of the 
result of that weighing. Substantial discretion exists here, 
too, though it is somewhat more canalized than it is in Georgia. 
Why these types of discretion are regarded by the plurality 
as constitutionally permissible, while that which may occur 
in the North Carolina system is not, is not readily apparent. 
The freakish and arbitrary nature of the death penalty 
described in the separate opinions of Stewart, J., and 
I 
White, J., in Furman arose not from the perception 
that so many capital sentences were being imposed:, but from 
the perception that so few were being imposed. To conclude 
fuat the North Carolina system is bad because juror nullifica-
tion may permit jury discretion while concluding that the 
Georgia and Florida systems are sound because they reguire 
this same discretion, is, as the plurality opinion demonstrates, 
inexplicable. 
The Texas system much more closely approximates the 
mandatory North Carolina system which is struck down today. 
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The jury is required to answer three statutory questions. If 
the questions are unanimously answered in the affirmative, 
the death penalty must be imposed. It is extremely difficult 
to see how this system can be any less subject to the infirmities 
caused by juror nullification which the plurality concludes are 
fatal to North Carolina's statute. The plurality apparently 
thinks it can sidestep this inconsistency because of its 
belief that one of the three questions will permit considera-
tion of mitigating factors justifying imposition of a life 
~ntence. It is, however, as the plurality recognizes, Jurek 
v. Texas, ante, at 8-9, far from clear that the statute is to 
be read in such a fashion. In any event, while the imposition 
of such unlimited consideration of mitigating factors may 
conform to the plurality's novel constitutional doctrine 
that ."[a] jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of 
all relevant evidence not only why a death sentence should 
be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed," id., at 
7-8. the resulting system seems as likely as any to produce 
the unbridled discretion which was condemned by the separate 
opinions in Furman. 
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The plurality seems to believe, see ante, at 20, that 
provision for appellate review will afford a check upon 
the instances of juror arbitrariness in a discretionary 
system. But it is not at all apparent that appellate 
review of death sentences, through a process of comparing 
the facts of one case in which a death sentence was impose d 
with the facts of another in which such a sentence was 
imposed, will afford any meaningful protection against 
whatever arbitrariness results from jury discretion. All 
that such review of death sentences can provide is a 
comparison of fact situations which must in their nature 
be highly particularized if not unique, and tfe only 
relief which it can afford is to single out the occasional 
death sentence which in the view of the reviewing court 
does not conform to the standards established by the 
legislature. 
It is established, of course, that there is no right 
to appellate review of a criminal sentence. McKane v. Durston, 
153 u.s. 684 (1894). That question is not at issue here, 
since North Carolina, along with the other four States whose 
systems the petitioners are challenging in these cases, 
provides appellate review for a death sentence imposed in 
one of its trial courts. 
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By definition, of course, there can be no separate 
appellate review of the factual basis for the sentencing 
decision in a mandatory system. If it is once established 
in a fairly conducted trial that the defendant has in fact 
committed the crime in question, the only question as to the 
rentence which can be raised on appeal is whether a 
legislative determination that such a crime should be 
punished by death violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Here both petitioners were 
convicted of first degree murder, and there is no 
serious question raised by the plurality that death is not 
a constitutionally permissible penalty for such a crime. 
But the plurality sees another role for appellate review 
in its description of the reasons why the Georgia, Texas, 
and Florida systems are upheld, and the North Carolina system 
stricken down. And it is doubtless true that Georgia in 
particular has made a substantial effort to respond to the 
concerns expressed in Furman, not an easy task considering 
the glossolalia! manner in which those concerns were 
expressed. The Georgia Supreme Court has[indicated that the 
Georgia death penalty statute requires it to review death 
sentences imposed by juries on the basis of rough "proportion-
ality". It has announced that it will not sustain, at 
.. 
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least at the present time, death penalties imposed for armed 
robbery because that penalty is so seldom imposed by juries 
fur that offense. It has also indicated that it will not 
sustain death penalties imposed for rape in certain fact 
situations, because the death penalty has been so seldom 
imposed on facts similar to those situations. 
But while the Georgia response may be an admirable one 
as a matter of policy, it has imperfections, if a failure 
to conform completely to the dictates of the separate 
opinions in Furman be deemed imperfections, which the 
plurality opinion does not point out. Although there may 
be some disagreement between the plurality opinion, and 
the opinion of my Brother White in Gregg v. Georgia, which 
I have joined, as to whether the proportionality review 
conducted by the Supreme Court of Georgia is based solely 
~on capital sentences imposed, or upon all sentences imposed 
in cases where a capital sentence could have been imposed 
by law, I shall assume for the purposes of this discussion 
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that the system contemplates the latter. But this is 
still far from a guarantee of any equality in sentencing, 
and is lik ewise no guarantee against juror nullification. 
Under the Ge orgia system, this jury is free to recommend life 
imprisonment, as opposed to death, for no stated reason 
W1atever. The Georgia Supreme Court cannot know, therefore, 
when it is reviewing jury sentences for life in capital 
cases, whether the jurors found aggravating circumstances 
present, but nonetheless decided to recommend mercy, or 
mstead found no aggravating circumstances at all ' and opted 
for mercy. So the "proportionality" type of review, while 
it would perhaps achie ve its obj ec tive if there were no 
possible factual lacunae in the jury verdicts, will not 
achieve its objective because there are necessarily such 
lacunae. 
Identical defects seem inherent in the systems of 
appellate review provided in Texas and Florida, for neither 
requires t he sentencing authority which concludes that a 
death penalty is inappropriate to state what mitigating 
factors were found to be present or whether certain 
aggravating factors urged by the prosecutor were actually 
found to be lacking. Without such detailed factual 
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findings the plurality's praise of appellate review as a 
cure for the constitutional infirmities which it identifies 
seems to me somewhat forced. 
Appellate review affords no correction 
whatever with respect to those fortunate f ew who are t he 
beneficiaries of random discretion exercised by juries, 
whether under an admittedly discretionary system or under 
a purportedly mandatory system. It may make corrections 
at one end of the spectrum, but cannot at the other. It 
is even less clear that any provision of the Constitution 
can be read to require such appellate review. If the 
States wish to undertake such an effort, they are undoubted l y 
free to do so, but surely it is not required by the United 
States Constitution. 
The Court's insistence on "standards" to "guide the 
jury in its inevitable exercise of the power to decide 
which murderer shall live and which shall die " is squarely 
contrary to the Court's opinion in McGautha, supra, 
authored by Mr. Justice Harlan and subscribed to by five 
other members of the Court only five years ago. So is the 
/ 
decision of the case, that Furman requires "objective 
standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally 
reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death." 
Its abandonment of stare decisis in this repudiation of 
McGautha is a far lesser mistake than its substitution of 
a superficial and contrived constitutional doctrine for 
the genuine wisdom contained in McGautha. There the Court 
addressed the "standardless discretion" contention in this 
language: 
Clin our view, such force as this argument has derives 
largely from its generality. Those who have come to ' 
grips with the hard task of actually attempting to draft 
means of channeling capital ~entencing discretion have 
confirmed the lesson taught by the history recounted 
above. To identify before the fact those characteristics 
of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call 
for the death penalty, and to express tbese characteristics 
in language which can be fairly understood and applied 
by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which 
are beyond present human ability. 
Thus the British Home Office, which before the recent 
abolition of capital punishment in tbst country had the 
responsibility for selecting the cases from England and 
Wales which should receive the benefit of the Royal 
Prerogative of Mercy, observed: 
...fJ-The difficulty of defining by :my statutory pro-
vision the types of murder which ought or ought 
not to be punished by death m.sy be illustrated by 
reference to the many diverse cofu-.iderations to which 
the Home Secretary has regard in deciding whether 
to recommend clemency. No simple formula can take 
account of the innumerable deg:-ees of culpability, 
and no formula which fails to do so can claim to 
be just or satisfy public opinion.~1-2 Royal Com-
mission on Capital Punishment, Minutes of Evi-
dence 13 (1949).-' 402 u.s., at 204-205. 
* * * 
.. 
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tions of human knowledge, we find it quite .tmpo.sstble 
to say that committing to the untrammeled dts~retw~ of 
the jury the power to pronounce life or d~ath. m capital 
cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution. The 
States are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with 
the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death 
for a fellow human will ad with due regard for the con-
sequences of their decision and will consider a variety 
of factors, many of which will have been suggested by 
the evidence or by the arguments of defense counsel. 
For a court to attempt to catalog the appropriate factors 
in this elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the 
scope of consideration, for no list of circumstances would 
ever be really complete. The infinite variety of cases 
and facets to each case. would make general standards 
either meaningless tfboiler-plate1) OJ: ..A... statement Of the_ _ 2 OS . . ld d "'l'l u :L u. s • , a t 2 -o 1 
obvwus that no JUry wou nee . · 
(citation omitted). 
It is also worth noting that the plurality opinion 
repudiates not only the view expressed by the Court in 
McGautha, but also, as noted in McGautha, the view which 
had been adhered to by every other American jurisdiction 
which had considered the question. See 402 u.s. at 196 
n. 8. 
IV. 
The plurality opinion's insistence, in Part III C, 
that if the death penalty is to be imposed there must be 
"particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the 
character and record of each convicted defendant" is 
buttressed by neither case authority nor reason. Its 
principal claim to distinction is that it contradicts 
important parts of Part III A in the same opinion. 
been society's turning away from the mandatory imposition of 
the death penalty, purports to express no opinion as to the 
constitutionality of a mandatory statute for "an extreme ly 
narrow category of homicide, such as murder by a prisone r 
serving a life sentence." See ante at n. 7. Yet if 
"particularized consideration" is to be required in every 
case under the doctrine expressed in Part III C, such a 
reservation in Part III A is disingenous at best. 
The requir~ment of "particularized consideration" in 
Part III C is, if consistent analysis still be thought 
relevant to doctrinal soundness, also fatally at odds with 
the major premise of Part III B of the plurality's opinion. 
Part III B denounces mandatory sentencing statutes be:.•cause, 
so the opinion says, the prevalence of juror nullification 
means that in practice even under mandatory statutes there 
will be subjective discretion exercised by jurors. Part 
III C, on the other hand, proceeds to denounce mandatory 
sentences because in theory, if not in practice, the jurors 
are not allowed to exercise any discretion in deciding 
whether the sentence should be imposed once they have 
determined that the defendant committed the offense in 
question. 
ny ~fie plurality 
in Part III C comes within a light year of estublishing the 
proposition that individualized consideration is a consti-
tutional requisite for the imposition of the death penalty. 
Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51 (1937}, upheld against a 
claim of violation of the Equal Protection Clause a 
Pennsylvania statute which made the sentence imposed upon 
a convict breaking out of a penitentiary dependent upon the 
length of the term which he was serving at the time of the 
break. In support of its conclusion that Pennsylvania had 
not denied the convict equal protection, the court observed: 
11 The comparative gravity of criminal 
offenses and whether their consequences 
are more or less injurious are matters 
for [the State's] determination •••• 
It may inflict a deserved penalty merely 
to vindicate the law or to deter or to 
reform the offender or for all of these 
purposes. For the determination of sentences, 
justice generally requires consideration of 
more than the particular acts by which the 
crime was committed and that there be taken 
into account the circumstances of the offense 
together with the character and propensities 
of the offender. His past may be taken to 
indicate his present purposes and tendencies 
and significantly to suggest the period of 
restraint and the kind of disciplint that 
ought to be imposed upon him... 302 u.s., at 
55. 
These words of Mr. Justice ~utler, speaking for the 
Court in that case, and those of Mr. Justice Black in 
Williams v. New York, 337 u.s. 241 (1949), the other opinion 
ne :J.:uTCt :1: -cy, :~:ena no supp-or 
the principle that the Constitution requires individualized 
consideration. This is not surprising, since even if such 
a doctrine had respectable support, which it has not, it is 
unlikely that either Mr. Justice Butler or Mr. Justice Black 
would have embraced it. 
The plurality also relies upon the indisputable pro-
position that "death is different" for the result which it 
reaches in Part III c. But the respects in which death is 
"different" from other punishment which may be imposed upon 
convicted criminals do not seem to me to establish the 
proposition that the Constitution requires individualized 
sentencing. 
One of the principal reasons why death is different 
is because it is irreversible~ an executed defendant 
cannot be brought back to life. This aspect of the 
difference between death and other penalties would un-
doubtedly support statutory provisions for especially 
careful review of the fairness of the trial, the accuracy 
of the fact-finding process, and the fairness cf the 
sentencing procedure where the death penalty is imposed. 
But none of those aspects of the death sentence is at issue 
here. Petitioners were found guilty of the crime of first 
which is unquestioned here. And since the punishment of 
death is conceded by the plurality not to be a cruel and 
unusual punishment for such a crime, the irreversible 
aspect of the death penalty has no connection whatever 
with any requirement for individualized consideration of 
the sentence. 
The second aspect of the death penalty which makes it 
"different" from other penalties is the fact that it is 
indeed an ultimate penalty, which ends a human life rather 
than simply requiring that a living human being be confined 
for a given period of time in a penal institution. This 
aspect of the difference may enter into the decision of 
whether or not it is a "cruel and unusual" penalty for a 
given offense. But since in this case the offense was 
first degree murder, that particular inquiry need proceed 
no further. 
The plurality's insistence on individualized considera-
tion of the sentencing, therefore, depends not upon any 
traditional application of the prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment. 
The punishment here is concededly not cruel and unusual, 
and that determination has traditionally ended judicial 
..... 
Punishment Clause. Trop v. Dulles, supra: Robinson v. 
California, supra: Louisiana ex rel Francis v. Resweber, 
supra; Wilkerson v. Utah, supra. What the plurality 
opinion has actually done ib to import into the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment what it conceives to be 
desirable procedural guarantees where the punishment of 
death, concededly not cruel and unusual for the crime of 
which the defendant was convicted, is to be imposed. This 
is squarely contrary to McGautha, and unsupported by any 
other decision of this court. 
I agree with the conclusion of the plurality', and with 
that of Mr. Justice White, that death is not a cruel and 
unusual punishment for the offense of which these petitioners 
were convicted. Since no member of the court suggests that 
the trial which led to those convictions in any way fell 
short of the standards mandated by the constitution, the 
judgments of conviction should be affirmed. The Fourteenth 
Amendment, giving the fullest scope to its "majestic 
generalities," Fay v. New York, 332 u.s. 261, :>82 (1947), 
is conscripted rather than interpreted when used to permit 




M-r. Justice Marsh:J.ll 
Mr. Justice Blacl<m un 
Mr . Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnqui~·-l. 
Jlr. Justice Stevens 
!rom!: ir. Justice Stev:a;:t 
Clr~ulated :·Jlfl~ 2 ~ 197u_ 
·~·· ·- "' ... ........ ..., . .. 
1st. :pRAF'F 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 75-5491 
James ~yron~ Wooqso~ 
and Luby W axton, 
Peti tionefl?, 
v, 
Sta~ of North QIU'olina. 
On Writ of Certiorari to th~ 
Supreme Court of North: 
Carolina. -
[June - 1 1976] 
delivered an op1n1on 
and announced the 
judgment of the 
MR, JusTICE S~wART, :MR. JusTICE P<?WELL, and MR1 
JusTICE STEVENS 
Court. The question in this case is whether the imposition o~ 
a death sentence for the crime of first-degree murder un-
der the law of North Carolina violates the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
I 
The petitioners were convicted of first-degree murder 
as the result of their participation in an armed robbery 
~ a convenience food store, in the course of which the 
~ cashier was killed and a customer seriously wounded. 
There were four participants in the robbery: the peti-
tioners Tyrone Woodson and Luby W axton and two 
others, Leonard Tucker and Johnnie Lee Carroll. At 
the petitioners' trial Tucker and Carroll testified for the 
prosecution after having been permitted to plead guilty 
to lesser offenses; the petitioners testified in their own 
defense. 
The evidence for the prosecution established that the 
four men had been discussing a possible robbery for 
some time. On the fatal day Woodson had been drink-
ing heavily. .-\bout 9.30 p.m., Waxton and Tucker came 
•,-
75-5491-SEPARATE 
2 WOODSON v. NORTH CAROLINA 
to the trailer where Woodson was staying. When 
Woodson came out of the trailer, W axton struck him 
'!'£·a·c·~~~i:o;:n-nth::-.;e:-:~ and threatened to kill him in an effort to 
~ ~;J make him sober up and come along on the robbery . . The 
three proceeded to W axton's trailer where they met Car-
roll. Waxton armed himself with a nickel-plated der-
ringer; and Tucker handed Woodson a rifle. The four 
then set out by automobile to rob the store. Upon ar-
riving at their destination Tucker and Waxton g t ? 1-
sf Mn em •••11' went into the store while Carroll and ""'-
Woodson remained in the car • ' · 1 as lookouts. Once ~ 
inside the store, Tucker purchased a package of cig- ._ 
arettes from the woman cashier. W axton then als~ 
asked for a package of IIi F~~·,u rsnt as tHe cashier (!igarette!) 
approached him he pulled the derringer out of his hip 
pocket and fatally shot her at point~ blank range. Wax-
ton then took the money tray from the c-ash register and 
·gave it to Tucker, who carried it out of the store, push-
ing past an entering customer as he reached the door. 
After he was outside, Tucker heard a second shot from 
inside the store, and shortly thereaft~r W axton emerged, 
carrying a handful of paper money. Tucker and Wax-
toil got in the car and the four drove away. 
The petitioners' testimony agreed in large part with 
this version of the circumstances of the robbery. It dif-
fered diametrically in one important respect: Waxton 
claimed e had a gun, and that Tucker had shot 
both the cashier and the customer. 
During the trial W axton asked to be allowed to plead 
guilty to the same lesser offenses to which Tucker had 
pleaded guilty,' but the solicitor refused to accept the 
J.Tucker had been allowed to plead guilty to charges of accessory 
after the fact to murder and to armed robbery. He was sentenced 
io 10 'l'ars imprisonment on tlw first: eha.r e and to not less 
,......,....,_,_-~t~IH~tn~:W~nor mort> than 30 on the Hecon , t 1e sen ences o run ~ars) 
wucurl't'ntly. - ~ 
~---~~·· 
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pleas.2 Woodson, by contrast, maintained throughout 
the trial that he had been coerced by W axton, that he 
was therefore innocent, and that he would not consider 
pleading guilty to any offense. 
The petitioners were found guilty on all charges,3 and, 
as was required by 'statute, sentenced to death. The 
Supreme Court o Carolina med. State v. 
Woodson, 215 S. E. 2d 607 287 N. C. 57~ 1975). We 
granted certiorari,- U.S.-, to consider whether the 
imposition of the death penalties in this case comports 
with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. 
II 
The petitioners argue that the · imposition of the death 
penalty under any circumstances is· cruel and unusual 
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. We reject this argument for the reasons · 
stated today in Gregg v. Georgia, ante, pp. •/3• '(!:"t- 30) 
III 
At the time of this Court's decision in Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), North Carolina law pro-
2 The solicitor gave no reason for refusing to accept. Waxtori's 
offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Supreme 
Court of North Carolina, in finding that the so icitor had not 
abused his discretion, noted: 
"The evidence that Waxton planned and directed the robbery and 
that he fired the shots which killed Mrs. Butler and wounded 
Mr. Stancil is overwhelming. No extenuating circumstances gave 
the solicitor any incentive to accept the plea he tendered at the 
close of the State's evidence." 287 N. C. 578, 595-596; 215 S. E. 
2d 607, (1975). 
3 In ad i ion to first-degree murder, both petitioners were found 
guilty of armed robbery. Waxton was also found guilty of assault 
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, a charge arising from the 
wounding of the customer. 
·' 
75-5491-BEP ARATE 
4 WOODSON v. NORTH CAROLINA 
vided that in cases of first-degree murder, the jury in its 
unbridled discretion could choose whether the convicted 
defendant should be sentenced to death or to life im-
prisonment.4 Mter the Furman decision the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina in State v. Waddell, 282 N. C. 
431, 194 S. E. 2d 19 (1973), held unconstitutional the 
provision of the death penalty statute that gave the jury 
the option of returning a verdict of guilty without cap-
ital punishment, but held further that this provision was 
severable so that the statute survived as a mandatory 
death penalty law.G 
The North Carolina General Assembly in 1974 fol-
lowed the court's lead and enacted a new statute that 
was essentially unchanged from the old one except that 
• The murder statute in effect in North Ca~olia until 1973 read 
as follows: 
('§ 14-17. Murder in the first and second degree defined; punish-
ment.-A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, 
lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other 
kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated , killing, or which shall 
be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any 
arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to 
be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with death: 
Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the 
jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for 
life in the State's prison, and the court shall so instruct the jury. 
All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the second 
degree, and shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than 
two nor more than thirty years in the State's prison." N. C. Gen. 
Stat. § 14-17 (1969 rep!. volume). 
6 The Court characterized the effect of the statute without the 
invalid provision as follows: 
"Upon the return of a verdict of guilty of any such offense, the 
,-------...~co~u~r~m;u~s~l~l In: a sentence of death. The punishment to be im-
pronounce posed for these~capital felonies is no longer a discretionary ques-
tion for the jury and therefore no longer a proper subject for~ 
in&iruction by the judge." 282 N.C., at 445, 194 S. E. Zd, at-,:;:'" ~
\ t: 
. ' ..... 
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it made the death penalty mandatory. The statute now 
· reads as follows: 
"Murder in the first and second degree defined; 
punishment.-A murder which shall be perpetrated 
by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, 
starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, 
deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall 
be committed in the perpetration or attempt to per-
petrate any arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, b~ 
glary or other felony shall be deemed to be ~ 
in the first degree and shall be punished with death. 
All other kinds of murder shall be deemed murder 
m the second egree and shall be unished by im-
prisonment o not less than two years nor more for a term 
than life imprisonment in the Stat~'s ~~·· N. C~ 
Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1971\) . 
It was under this statute that the petitioners, who 
committed their crime on June 3, 1974, were tried, con-
victed, and sentenced to death. 
North Carolina, unlike Florida, Georgia, and Texas, 
has thus responded to the Furman decision by making 
death the mandatory sentence for all persons convicted 
of first-degree murder." In ruling on the constitution-
ality of the sentences imposed on the petitioners under 
this North Carolina statute, the Court now addresses for 
the first time the question whether a death sentence re-
turned pursuant to a law imposing a mandatory death 
penalty for a broad category of homicidal offenses 7 con-
~North Carolina also has enacted a mandatory death sentence 
~me of first-degree rape. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-21 
~ t~u_!!~-,~UIJP : l:''I'J.· 
7 This case does not involve a mandatory death penalty statute 
limited to an extremely narrow category of homicide, such as murder 
by a prisoner serving a life sentence, defined in large part in terms of 
• ,f 
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stitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the mean-
ing of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.8 The 
issue, like that explored in Furman, involves the proce-
dure employed by the State to select persons for the 
unique and irreversible penalty of death.9 
A 
The Eighth Amendment stands to assure that the 
State's power to punish is "exercised within the limits 
"of civ1f1zed .... Dq: ." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86, 100 
(1958) (plurtiity opinion). See id., at 101; Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373, 378 (1910); Louisiana 
·ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 468-469 (1947) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); 10 Robinson v. California, 
the character or record of the offender. We thus express no opinion 
regarding the constitutionality of such a statute. See n. 25, infra. 
8 The Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment has been held to be applicable to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U. S. 
660(1962). Cj 
The Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), 
involved statutes providing for 'urv discr · n ·n the im o · · 
death sentences. Several ;(embers of the Court in Furman ex-
pressly dec:;lined to state tl:ie1r views regarding the constitutionality 
of mandatory death sentence statutes. See id., at 257 (Douglas, J., 
concurring); id., at 307 (STEWART, J., concurring); id., at 310-311 
(WHITE, J ., concurring). 
8 The petitioners here, as in the other four death penalty cases be-
fore the Court, contend that their sentences were imposed in viola-
tion of the Constitution because North Carolina has failed to elimi-
nate discretion from all phases of its procedure for imposing capital 
punishment. We have rejected similar claims today in Gregg, Prof-
fitt, and Jurek. The mandatory nature of the North Carolina death 
penalty statute for first-degree murder presents a different. ques-
tion under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
1.o Mr. Justice Frankfurter contended that the Eighth Amendment 
did not apply to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. He 
believed, however, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
7l)-5491-SEP ARATE 
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370 U. S. 660, 666 (1962); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 
238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 269-270 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 329 (MARSHALL, J., 
concurring); id., at 382-383 (BuRGER, C. J., dissenting); 
id., at 40J (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting); id., at 428--429 
(PoWELL, J., dissenting). Central to the application of 
the Amendment is a determination of contemporary 
standards regarding the infliction of punish:_:;m:;_:e~n;.t·~;,:A~s-r.~-:-:::­
discussed in Gregg v. Georgia, ante, pp. - :? , mdicia Q '1-:;l..o 
of societal values identified in prior opinions include 
history and traditional usage/1 legislative enactments,1z 
and jury determinationsY 
In order to provide a frame for assessing the relevancy 
of these factors in this case we begin by sketching the 
history of mandatory death penalty statutes in : the 
United States. At the time the Eighth Amendment was 
adopted in 1791, the States uniformly followed the com-
mon-law practice of making death · the exclusive ! and 
Amendment itself "expresses a demand for civilized standards." 
· Louisiana ex rel . Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S., at 468 (concurring 
opinion). 
11 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. at 99 (plurality opinion) (dictum). 
See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 291 (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring) . 
12 See Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 377 (1910) (noting 
that the punishment of cadena temporal at issue in that case had "no 
fellow in American legislation"); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U, S. 238, 
~~ (1972) (PoWELL, J., dissenting); Gregg v. Georgia, ante, 
18 See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 and n. 15 (1968); 
McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 201-202 (1971); Fur. 
man v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 8I8ft!' A lj I ~ c . &l; 'd ,_. r 
388 (BURGER, C. J., dissenting); id., at 439-441 (PowELL, J., dis-
senting) ("Any attempt to discern, therefore, where prevailing 
standards of decency lie must take careful account of the jury's re-
sponse to the question of capital punishment."). 
,; 
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mandatory sentence for certain specified offenses.14 Al-
though the range of capital offenses in the American 
colonies was quite limited in comparison to the more 
than 200 offenses then punishable by death in England/5 
the colonies at the time of the Revolution imposed 
death sentences on all persons convicted of any of a 
considerable number of crimes, typically including at 
a minimum, murder, treason, piracy, arson, rape, rob-
bery, burglary, and sodomy.16 As at common law, all 
homicides that were not involuntary, provoked, justified, 
or excused constituted murder and were automatically 
punished by death.17 Almost from the outset jurors 
reacted unfavorably to the harshness of mandatory death 
sentences.u The States initially responded to this ex-
pression of public dissatisfaction with mandatory stat- 1if' 
utes by limiting the classes of capital offenses." ~· ~ 
Ilia . · w a t • r •t:._li!_,.:~JIJ: d 
HSee H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in: America _.;;(rev. ed. (S-(,..) IS';)..] -.l8') 
1967). ~ 
15 See id., at 1-2; R. Bye, Capital Punishment in the United States 
1-2 (1919) . 
16 See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, at 6; 
Bye, Capital Punishment in the United States, supra, at 2-3 
ost New England colonies made 12 offenses capital. Rhode Is-
land, with 10 capital crimes, was the "mildest of all of the colo-
nies.") ; Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 284 
Annals of the Amer. Academy 8, 10 (1952) ("The English colonies 
in this country had from ten to eighteen capital offenses.") . 
11 See H. Bedau, Th~> Death Penalty in America, supra, at 23-24. 
::18 See id., at 27; Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capi-
tal Cases, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1099, 1102 (1953) ; Mackey, The 
Inutility of l'vlandatory Capital Punishment: An Historical Note, 
54 B. U. L. Rev. 32 (1974) ; McGautha v. California, 402 U. S. 183, 
198-199 (1971); Andres v. United Stat es, 333 U.S. 740, 753 (1948) 
(Frankfurter, J ., concurring) ; Winston v. United States, 172 U. S. 
303, 310 (1899). 
19 See R. Bye, Capital Punishment in the United States, supra, at 
5. During the colonial period, Pennsylvania under the Great Law 
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G-0~...---:'iili.iiiiJ•i. ITa, reform, however, left unresolved the prob-
~~ lem posed by the not infrequent refusal of juries to con-
vict murderers rather than subject them to automatic 
death sentences. In 1794, Pennsylvania attempted to 
alleviate the undue severity of the law by confining 
the mandatory death penalty to "murder of the first 
degree" encompassing all "willful, deliberate and pre-
meditated'' killings. Pa. Laws 1794 c. 1777.2{) Other 
jurisdictions, including Virginia and Ohio, soon enacted 
similar measures, and within a generation the practice 
spread to most of the States.n 
Despite the broad acceptance of the division of mur-
der into degrees, the reform proved to be an unsatisfac-
tory means of identifying persons appropriately punish-
able by death. Although its failure was due in part to 
the amorphous nature of the controlling concepts of will-
fulness, deliberateness, and premeditati.on,22 a more fun-
damental weakness of the reform soon became apparent. 
Juries continued to find the death penalty inappropriate 
in a significant number of first-degree "murder cases and 
refused to return guilty verdicts for that crime.23 
of William Penn limit ed capital punishment to murder in 168Z. 
Following Penn's death in 1718, however, Pennsylvania greatly ex-
panded the number of capital offenses. See Hartung, Trends in the 
Use of Capital Punishment, supra, at 9-10. 
Many States during the early 19th century significantly reduced 
the number of crimes punishable by death . See Davis, The Move--
ment to Abolish Capital Punishment in America, 1787- 1861, 63 ~ 
Amer. Hist. Rev. 23, 27 and n. 15 (1957) ]!!'*" · -oc"""'Ti-iili3 "ISL'~'i"" ~ 
d 'L fUll. 6 i ili'U). 
20 See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, at 24. 
21 See ibid.; Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment 
in America, 1787-1861 , supra, at 26-27 n. 13. By the late 1950s;. 
some 34 States had adopted the Pennsylvania formulation , and only· 
10 States retained a single category of murder as defined a~Torr @ . 
law. See Model Penal Code § 201.6, Comment 2, p . . ent.. '-"'~ 
Draft No.9, 1959) . 
22 See McGautha v. Cailfornia, 402 U. S. 183, 198-199 (1971). 
t 3 See li. l3edau, The D~tth Pf)nalty in Ameri.ca, supra, at 27;; 
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The inadequacy of distinguishing between murde~ @:9 
solely on the basis of legislative criteria narrowing the 
definition of the capital offense led the States to grant 
juries sentencing discretion in capital cases. Tennessee 
in 1838, followed by Alabama in 1841, and Louisiana in 
1846, were the first States to abandon mandatory -death 
sentences in favor of discretionary death penalty stat-
utes.24 This flexibility remedied the harshness of man-
datory statutes by permitting the jury to respond to 
mitigating factors by withholding the death penalty. 
By the turn of the century, 23 Stat~ and the Federal \. ~ 
Government had made death senten~ discretionary for ~ 
first-degree murder and other capital offenses. During 
the next two decades 14 additional States replaced their 
mandatory death penalty statutes. Thus, by the end 
of World War I, all but eight States.- Hawaii, and the 
District of Columbia \&@)e1therkdopted discretionary 
death penalty schemes or abolished the death penalty 
altogether. By 1963, all of these remaining jurisdic-
tions had replaced their automatic death penalty stat-
utes with discretionary jury sentencing.25 
· The history of mandatory death penalty statutes in 
Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital Punishment: An His-
torical Note, supra; McGautha v. California, supra, at 199. 
24 See Tenn. Laws 1837-1838, c. 29; Ala. Laws 184(;"~La--. ~L-a~-,.::;---' c.3J 
: c. 139. See also W. Bowers, Executions ip. Arrte'f-ica..- ( 19 7 4)) 
Prior to the Tennessee reform in 1838, Maryland had changed 
from a mandatory to an optional death sentence for the crimes of 
treason, rape, and· arson. Md. Laws 1809, c. 138. For a time 
_....,...--------~ di.tring the early colonial period Massachusetts, as part. of its 
C:~apitall Lawes'~ of 1636, had a nonmandatory provision for the 
-~ crime of rape. See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty, supra, at 28. _ 
25 See W. Bowers, Executions in America PI 11 lit-( Table 1 2" (, supra , at 7-v 
sets forth the date eaeh State adopted discretio&!ry jury sentenc- ~':...,;;;;;;;;:;;:,;_ __ _. 
in · B · f for the United States as Amicus Curiae in McGautha v. 
r;,;..---...... -I-... ~... ·a~li;f_o_rn"':"i...;a,-.N.,.o_7 ... 0-_2_o"f_)A) . C statutes in force 
App. B (listing the statutes in each state initi~lly 
introducing discretionary jury sentencing in cap~tal 
cases), 
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the United States thus reveals that the practice of sen-
tencing to death all persons convicted of a particular 
offense has been rejected as unduly harsh and unwork-
ably rigid. The two crucial indicators of evolving stand-
in 1970 providing for discretionary jury sentencing in capital murder 
cases). 
Prior to this Court's 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U. S. 238, there remained a handful of obscure statutes scattered 
among the penal codes in variou.s States that required an automatic 
death sentence upon conviction of a specilfied offense. These 
statutes applied to such esoteric crimes as trainwrecking resulting in 
death, perjury in a capital case resulting in the execution of an in-
nocent person, and treason against a state government . See H. 
Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, at 46-47 (1964 com-
pilation). The most prevalent of these statutes dealt 'with the 
crime of treason against state governments. t ap- :C b l J.. .. 
pears that no one has ever been prosecuted . under these or other _____ _, 
state treason laws. See Hartung, Trends in the Use of Capital 
Punishment, supra, at 10. See also T . Sellin, The Death Penalty: 
A Report for the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law 
Institute 1 ( 1959) (discussing the Michigan · statute, subsequently 
repealed in 1963, and the North Dakota statute). Several States 
retained mandatory death sentences for perjury in capital cases re-
sulting in the execution of an innocent. person. Data covering the 
years from 1930 to 1961 indicate, however, that no State employed 
its capital perjury statute during that period. See H. Bedau, The 
Death Penalty in America, supra, at 46. E.-@ 
The only category of mandatory death sentence statute that ap- - S 
pears to have had any relevance to the actual administrat on of the 
death penalty in the years preceeding Furman concerned the crimes 
of murder or assault with a deadly weapon by a life-term prisoner. 
Statutes of this type apparently existed in five States in 1964. See 
id., at 46-47. In 1970, only five of the more than 550 prisoners 
under death sentence across the country had been sentenced under 
a mandatory death penalty statute. Those prisoners had all been 
convicted under the California statute applicable to assaults by life-
term prisoners. See Brief of the NAACP as Amicus Curiae in 
McGautha v. California, No. 70-203, at 15 n. 19. We have no 
occasion in this case to examine the constitutionality of mandatory 
death sent<'ncc :;ta.tutes applica.ole to prisoners serving life sentences. 
. . 
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a.rds of decency respecting the imposition of puni~~ 
ment in our society-jury determinations and legislative 
enactments-both point conclusively to the repudiation 
of automatic death sentences. At least since the Revo-
lution, American jurors have, with some regularity, dis-
regarded their oaths and refused to convict defendants 
where a death sentence was the automatic consequence 
of a guilty verdict. As we have seen, the initial move-
ment to reduce the number of capital offenses and , to 
separate murder into degrees was prompted in part by 
the reaction of jurors as well as by reformers who ob-
jected to the imposition of death as the penalty for 
any crime. Nineteenth century journalists, statesmen, 
and jurists repeatedly observed that . jurors were often 
deterred from convicting palpably. guilty men of first-
. degree murder under mandatory statu~s.26 . Thereafter, 
continuing evidence of jury reluctance to convict persons 
of capital offenses in mandatory death penalty jurisdiC-
tions resulted in legislative authorization of discretion-
ary jury sentencing-by. Congress for federal crimes in 
1897/7 by North Carolina in 1949,28 and by Congress for 
the District of Columbia in 1962.2 9 
26 See Mackey, The Inutility of Mandatory Capital }>unishment: 
An Historical Note, supra. . 
27 See H. R. Rep. No . 108, 54th Cong., 1st Sess. (1896) (The re~ 
port noted that the modification of the federal capital statutes to 
make the death penalty discretionary was in harmony with "a ! 
.. growing public sentiment." /d., at 2, quoting H. R.(No. 545, 53d { KQ. e. J 
Cong., 2d Sess.\.1 (1894)); S. Rep. No. 846, 53d COng., 3d Sess. 
(1895). 
28 See Report of the Special Commission for the Improvement of 
the Administration of Justice, Improving the Administration of Jus-
tice in North Carolina, Popular Government 13 (Jan. 1949). 
29 See Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Judiciary of the 
Senate Committee on the District of Columbia 19- 20 (May 17, 1961) 
(testimony of Sen. Keating) . Data eompiled by a former United 
States Attorney for the District of Columbia indicated that furies . . 
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As we have noted today in Gregg v. Georgia, •crlll~•"';;j[~?;;;~;p;:.'\'\'lfin~.\<\ qqJ~\ '\~0 
.....,legislative measures adopted by the people's chosen :. 
representatives weigh heavily in ascert~tining contem-
porary standards of decency. The consistent course 
charted by the state legislatures and by Congress since 
·convicted defendants of first-degree murder in only 12 of the 60 jury 
trials for first-degree murder held in the District of Columb111 bt>--
twe~n July 1, 1953, and February 1960. ' - e conv1e- Ui.(• 
tion rate was "substantially below the general · verage 111 pro~ecut.- ___ ,_,_ _ _.. 
·ing other crimes." Jd., at 20. The lower conviction rat.t> was 
attributed to the reluctance of jurors to impose the harsh con~e-
quences of a first-degree murder conviction in cases where the record 
might justify a lesser punishment. Ibid. See McCafferty, MaJor 
Trends in the Use of Capital Punishment, 1 Crim. L. Q. 9, 14-15 
(1963) (discussing a similar study of first-degree murder cases in 
the District of Columbia during the period .Tuly 1, 1947, through 
June 30, 1958). 
A study of the death penalty submitted to rhe American Law In-
stitute noted that juries in Massachusetts and Connecticut had "for 
many years" resorted to second-degree murder conv1ctwns to avoid 
the consequences of those States' mandatory $1eath penalty statutes 
for first-degree murder , pnor to their replacement w1th discretionary 
sentencing in 1951. Sec T . Srllin, The Death Penalty: A Report to 
the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law Institute 13 
(1959). 
A 1973 Pennsylvania legislative report surveying the available 
literature analyzing mandatory death s<>ntence 
statutes concluded: 
"Although the data collection techniques in some instances are 
weak, the uniformity of the conclusions m substantiating what theRe 
authors' termed 'jury nullification' (i.e. refusal to convict because of 
the required penalty) is impressive. Authors on both sides of the 
capital punishment debate reached essentially the same conclusions. 
Authors writing about the mandatory death penalty who wrote in 
1892 reached the same conclusions as persons writing in tlw 1950'~· 
and 1960's'' 
McCloskey, A Review of the Literature Contrasting 'Mandatory and 
Disrretionary Systems of Sentencing Capital Cases, Pa. GSCCJ>-
Report No. 2, published in Heport of the Governor's Study Com-
mission on Capital Puni~htnent 101 (Sept. 1973) . 
- ' . 
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~. the middle of the past century demonstrates that the 
~--aversion of JUrors-. mandatory death penalty statutes 
is shared by society lt large.30 
Still further evidence of the incompatibility of manda-
tory death penalties with contemporary values is pro-
vided by the results of jury sentencing under discretion-
ary statutes. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 
( 1968), the Court observed that "one of the most im-
portant functions any jury can perform" in exercising its 
discretion to choose "between life imprisonment and 
capital punishment" is "to maintain a link between con-
temporary community values and the penal system." 
Id., at 519 and n. 15. Various studies indicate that even 
in first-degree murder cases juries with sentencing dis-
cretion do not impose the death penalty "with any great 
frequency." H. Kalven and H. Zeisel, The American 
Jury 436 (1966).31 The actions of sentencing juries sug-
80 Not only have mandatory death sentence laws for murder been 
abandoned by legislature after legislature since Tennessee replaced 
its mandatory statute 138 years ago, but, with a single exception, no 
State prior to this Court 's Furman decision in 1972 ever returned 
to a mandatory scheme after adopting discretionary sentencing. 
See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, supra, at 30; W. 
Bowers, Executions in America, supra, at 9. Vermont, which first 
provided for jury discretion in 1911, was apparently prompted to re-
turn to mandatory sentencing by a "veritable crime wave of twenty 
murders" in 1912. See H. Bedau, The Death Penalty in America, 
supra, at 30. Vermont reinstituted discretionary jury sentencing in 
1957. 
81 Data compiled on discretionary jury sentencing of persons con-
victed of capital murder reveal that the penalty of death is gen-
erally imposed in less than 20% of the cases. See Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U. S. 238, 386-387, n. 11 (1972) (BuRGER, C. J ., dissent-
ing); id., at 435-436 n. 19 (PowELL, J., dissenting); Brief for the 
Petitioner in Aikens v. Cailfornia, No . 68--5027, at App. F (collect-
ing data from a number of jurisdictions indicating that the per-
centage of death sentences in many States was well below 20%) . 
Statistics compiled by the Department of Justice show that only 
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gest that under contemporary standards of decency 
death is viewed as an inappropriate punishment for a 
substantial portion of convicted first-degree murderers. 
Although the Court has never ruled on the constitu-
tionality of mandatory death penalty statutes, on several 
occasions dating back to 1899 it has commented upon 
our society's aversion to automatic death sentences. In 
Winston v. United States, 172 U. S. 303 (1899), the 
Court noted that the "hardship of punishing with death 
every crime coming within the definition of murder at 
common law, and the reluctance of jurors to concur in a 
~capital convictio~have induced American legislatures, in 
modern times, to allow some cases of murder to be un-
~ne(foyimpriSoilffie;~instead of by death." 32 Fiftf@. ,:~at 310 J 
years after Winston, the Court underscored tlie marked 
transformation in our attitudes towards mandatory sen.l 
tences: "The belief no longer prevails that every offense 
in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment 
without regard to the past life and habits. of a particular 
offender. This whole country has traveled far from the 
period in which the death sentence was an automatic 
and commonplace result of convictions .... " Williams 
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241,247 (1949). 
f\fore recently, the Court in McGautha v. California, 
402 U. S. 183 (1971), detailed the evolution of discre-
tionary imposition of death sentences in this country,, 
~victed mui71~ were sentenced to death in 1972. See Law 
Enforcement Assista'iice Administration, Capital Punishment, 1971-
1972 (National Prisoner Statistics Bulletin Dec. 1974) (Table 7a) (the figure does nc : 
32 Later, in Andres v. United States, Justice Frankfurter observed include persons 
that the 19th century movement leading to the passage of legisla- retained in loc a 1 
tion providing for discretionary sentencing in capital cases "was im- facilities during 
pelled both by ethical and humanitarian arguments against capital the pend ancy 0 f 
punishment, as well as by the practical consideration that juroi'S' h . l ) 
were reluctant to bring in verdicts which inevitably called for its. __ t_e_l._r_a __ ~e~ -~ --·---....-
__.. ______ iJ,',fliction." 333 U. S. 740, 753 (1948} (concurring opinio~ 
Gn INSERT ~r--------------
Add to footnote 32 (at the end of the current footnote) - Insert 1 
The Court in Andres noted that the decision of Congress at the end 
of the 19th century to replace mandatory death sentences with dis-
cretionary jury sentencing for federal capital crimes was prompted 
by "[d]issatisfaction over the harshness and antiquity of the federal 
criminal laws." Id., at 747-748 n. 11. 
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prompted by what it termed the American "rebellion 
against the common-law rule imposing a mandatory 
death sentence on all convicted murderers." /d., at 198. 
See id., at 19~202. Perhaps the one important factor 
about evolving social values regarding capital punish-
ment upon which the members of the Furman Court 
agreed was the accuracy of McGautha's assessment of 
our Nation's rejection of mandatory death sentences. 
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. 8., at 245-246 (Douglas, 
J., concurring); id., at 297-298 (BRENNAN, J., concur-
ring); id., at 339 (MARSHALL, J., concurring); id., at 
402-403 (BuRGER, C. J., with whom BLACKMUN, PowELL, 
and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, dissenting); id., at 413 
(BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, 
for example, emphasized that legislation requiring an 
automatic death sentence for specified . crimes would be 
"regressive and of an antique mold" and would mark 
a return to a "point in our criminology [passed beyond] 
long ago." /d., at 413. THE CHIEF JusTICE, speaking 
for the four dissenting justices in Furman, discussed the 
question of mandatory death sentences at some length: 
"I had thought that nothing was clearer in history, 
as we noted in M cGautha one year ago, than the 
American abhorrence of 'the common-law rule im-
posing a mandatory death sentence on all convicted 
murderers.' 402 U. 8., at 198. As the concurring 
opinion of Mt. J..J!sti~ MJ\.r.sh!lll shows, ante, at 339, 
the 19th century move~ay from mandatory 
death sentences marked an enlightened introduction 
of flexibility into the sentencing process. It recog-
nized that individual culpability is not always 
measured by the category of the crime committed. 
This change in sentencing practice was greeted by 
the Court as a humanizing development. See Win-
ston v. United States, 172 U.S. 303 (1899); ct 
75-5491-8EPARATE 
WOODSON v. NORTH CAROLINA 17 
Calton v. Utah, 130 U. S. 83 ( 1889). See also 
Andres v. United States, 333 U. S. 740, 753 (1948) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)." 408 U. S., at 402. 
Although it seems ~eyond dispute that, at the time of 
the Furman decision in 1972, mandatory death penalty 
statute"rs had been renounced by American juries and -legislatures, there remains the question whether the' 
mandatory statutes adopted by North Carolina and a 
number of other States following Furman evince a sud-
den reversal of societal values regarding the imposition 
of capital punishment. In view of the persistent and· 
unswerving legislative rejection of mandatory death pen-
alty statutes beginning in 1838 and continuing for more 
than 130 years until Furman, 33 it seems evident that the 
post-Furman enactments reflect attempts by the States 
to retain the death penalty in a form consistent with the 
Constitution, rather than a renewed societal acceptance 
of mandatory death sentencing.34 The fact that some 
States have adopted mandatory measures following Fur-
man while others have legislated standards to guide jury 
discretion ~P.P$.:.\.r ... s, attributable to diverse read~'ngs of 
this Court's multibpinioned decision in that case. 35/ 
f l ' -
A brief examination of the background of the current 
North Carolina statute serves to reaffirm our assessment . 
88 See n. 30, supra. 
u A study of public opinion polls on the death penalty concluded 
that "despite the increasing approval for the death penalty reflected 
in opinion polls during the last decade, there is evidence that many 
people supporting the general idea of capital punishment want its 
administration to depend on the circumstances of the case, the-
character of the defendant, or both." Vidmar and Ellsworth, Pub-
lic Opinion and the Death Penalty, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 1245, 126T 
(1974). One poll discussed by the authors revealed that a "sub-
stantial majority" of persons opposed mandatory capital punish-
ment. !d., at 1253. l\Ioreover, the public through the jury sys-
tem has in recent Years applied the death penalty in anything but 
4"'"'"7~ a mnndatory fa slllQJ1 .. srr n.. 1, supra. 
35/ Insert 2 
Page ~new footnote 35 -- Insert 2 
35 1 
The fact that, as Mr. Justice Rehnquist 1s dissent 
properly notes, some States "preferred mandatory capital punish-
ment to no capital punishment at all," post at p. 9, is entitled to 
some weight. But such an artificial choice merely establishes a 
desire for some form of capital punishment; it is hardly "utterly 
inconsistent with the notion that [those states] regarded maridatory 
capital sentencing as beyond 1 evolving standards of decency, 1 " 
Ibid. It says no more about contemporary values than would the 
decision of a State thinking itself faced with a choice between a bar-
barous punishment and no punishment at all to choose the former. 
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of its limited utility as an indicator of contemporary 
values regarding mandatory death sentences. Before 
1949, North Carolina imposed a mandatory death sen-
tence on any person convicted of rape or first-degree 
murder. That year, a study commission created by the 
state legislature recommended that juries be granted dis-
cretion to recommend life sentences in all capital cases: 
"We propose that a recommendation of mercy b 
the jury in t' capital case automa ICa y carry w1t 
it a life sentence. Only three other states now 
have the mandatory death penalty and we believe 
that its retention will be definitely harmful. Quite 
@" frequent~juries refuse to convict for rape or first 
degree murder because, from all the circumstances, 
they do not believe the defendant, although guilty, 
should suffer death. The result is that verdicts are ' 
returned hardly in harmony with evidence. Our 
proposal is already in effect in respect to the crimes 
of burglary and arson. There is much testimony : 
that it has proved beneficial in such cases. We 
think the law can now be broadened to include all 
·capital crimes." 
Report of the Special Commission For the Improvement 
. of the Administration of Justice, Improving the Admin-
istration of Justice in North Carolina, Popular Govern-
ment 13 (Ja.n. 1949). 
The 1949 session of the General Assembly of North 
Carolina adopted the proposed modifications of its rape 
and murder statutes. Although in subsequent years nu-
merous bills were introduced in the legislature to further 
... or abolish the death penalty in North arolina, 
they were rejected as were two 1969 proposals to return 
to mandatory death sentences for all capital offenses. 
See State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 441, 194 S. E. 2d 19, 
26 (opinion of the Court); 282 N. C., at 45~57, 194 
7~5491-8EPARATE 
WOODSON v. NORTH CAROLINA 19 
S. E. 2d, at 32- 33 (Bobbitt, C. J., concurring in part and 
· dissenting in part). 
'Z eHn *b! 'QeWI-'I•Pda-i•ien ~ ie fer-a·, ih )ln\th 
1 Carolin~n~-the-eonstitution~ 
: ei the St·~prellalt.y....sta.tu~~luded th~ 
· F..uanan-~-t~nee air ii~e•Oti~80"'a.u­
thorizing jury l discretioRTbut.atlu"t- . "ihet'rema.itldel'~the , 
statute I with -death as"the mandatory punishment· 
remains in··1ull· fo1'ee--and effect:<J... State· . Wadde'U;"'28Z 
~*l at..M.:L445,, l94 S .. E.~;· a.t - ·. IfP"I-974, -the 
North ··· Ca:rolin& .. ~ugislature~•'loUowoo ·:.the · OOll~ 
viously found «>nstitutionak!wrw.nldeU~nd :enacted ·a 
· fttst-de.gree m.t.u;der:...p~o,yisioJl:identical tO"'the mandatory_,. 
· statute il1 · operatiorr~-prior t<r-ther.a.uthoriZRtiorr-·of"'jury·• 
discfmiotr." The State's brief in this case relates that 
the legislature sought to remove "all sentencing discre-
. tion [so that] there would be no successful Furman 
based attack upon the North Carolina statute." 
It is now well established that the Eighth Amendment 
draws much of its meaning from "the evolving standards 
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing so-
ciety." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S~, at 101 (plurality 
opinion) . As the above discussion makes clear, one of 
the most significant developments in our society's 
treatment of capital punishment has been the rejection 
of the common-law practice of inexorably imposing a 
death sentence upon every person convicted of a speci-
fied offense. North Carolina's mandatory death penalty 
statute for first-degree murder departs markedly from 
contemporary standards respecting the imposition of the 
1"" • · Jj 1 g ' I • I 1 d1 h punishment of death and thus 
cannot be applied consistently with the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments' requirement that the State'S' 
p0\'>'er to punish "be exercised \vithin the limits of civil-
(standardif ized-·· · " !d., at 100.F " 
36/ Insert 3B 
A - 1~· 
As noted above, suprn p. 4, when the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina analyzed the constitutionality of the State's death 
• penalty statute following this Court's decision in Furman, it 
severed the 1949 proviso authorizing jury sentencing discretion 
and held that "the remainder of the statute with death as the 
mandatory punishment . . . remains in full force and effect." 
State v. Waddell, 282 N.C., at 444-445, 194 S.E.2d~, at 28. The 
North Carolina General Assembly then followed the course ~~. ~~~~-.~ 
found constitutional in Waddell and enacted a first-degree 
murder provision identical to the mandatory statute in operation 
prior to the authorization of jury discretion. 
P. ~add footnote 3 6 - Insert 3 B 
36 / 
Dissenting opinions in this case and in Roberts v. 
Louisiana, post, argue that this conclusion is "simply mistaken" be-
cause the American rejection of mandatory death sentence statutes 
might possibly be ascribable to "some maverick juries or jurors." 
Post at 4, 8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Roberts v. Louisiana, 
post, at 25 (White , J., dissenting). Since acquittals no less than 
convictions required unanimity and citizens with moral reservations 
concerning the death penalty were regularly excluded from capital 
juries, it seems hardly conceivable that the persistent 
. -~ refusal of American juries to convict palpably guilty defend-
ants of capital offenses under mandatory death sentence statutes merely 
"represented the intransigence of only a small minority" of jurors. 
Post at '7 (Rehnquist, J. , dissenting). Moreover, the dissenting opinirns 
simply ignore the experience under discretionary death sentence statutes 
indicating that juries reflecting contemporary community values, 
Witherspoon v. illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 & n. 15, found the death 
penalty appropriate for only a small minority of convicted first degree 
murderers. See note 31 supra. We think it evident that the uniform 
assessment of the historical record by members of this Court beginning 
in 1899 in Winston v. United States, supra, and continuing through the 
footnote 3 6 - continued 
dissenting opinions of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun 
~\l.l 
four years ago in Furman, see pp. lA-1~ & n. 3~ supra, provide 
a far more cogent and persuasive explanation of the American re-
jection of mandatory death sentences than do the speculations in 
today's dissenting opinions. 
. ' '· 
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B 
A se~rate deficiency of North Carolina's mandatory 
death sentence statute is its failure to provide a consti-
tutionally tolerable response to Furman's rejection of 
unbridled jury discretion in the imposition of capital sen-
tences. Central to the limited holding in Furman was 
the conviction that the vesting of standardless sentencing 
power in the jury violated the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S., at 309-
310 (STEWART, J., concurring); id., at 313 (WHITE, J., 
concurring); cf. id., at 253-257 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring). See also id., at 398-399 (BuRGER, C. J., dissent-
ing). It is argued that North Carolina has remedied 
the inadequacies of the death penalty statutes held un-
constitutional in Furman by withdrawing all sentencing 
discretion from juries in capital cases. But when one 
considers the long and consistent American experience 
with the death penalty in first-degree murder cases·, it 
becomes evident that mandatory statutes enacted in re-
sponse to Furman have simply papered over the problem 
of unguided and unchecked Jury discretion. 
As we have noted in Part III-A. supra, there is gen-
eral agreement that American juries have )Prsistentl G£ that o ffensi).__ refused to convict a significant portion of first-deg~e persons 
--------- mu~d~ under mandatory death penalty statutes. 
, supra p. 18 rorthC9."rOTma study commissioiD,!eported th~-~ ~ 
~=~=;..,..:; __ ......;'~ juries in that state "[q]uite freQ'uently'' were deterred 
Cili 
® 
from rendering guilty verdicts of first-degree murder be-
cause of the enormity of the sentence automatically im-
posed. Moreover, as a matter of historic fact, juries 
operating under discretionary sentencing statutes have 
consistently returned death sentences in only a minority 
of first-degree murder cases~ In view of the historic 
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. . .,......--· many "'j ur'ie s msu-. 
record, it is only reasonable to assume that ?•n.• ~ under mandatory 
_,.. a it 111 i d th I ?H'r* t'd l rM••if•r- statutes will 
<W•n l r ,]@ PM OBI. r 1il1rll8: S?Pl:i"SfiQaJ 14 n•z continue to 
,_,,lllll'lri••• *••B I ••••hi u .. MI!iliiPiaf*' a consider the 
~-\'Jf'.i'ttttltii•ti~ ..... North Carolina's mandatory grave consequen-
death penalty statute provides no standards to guide the ces of a con vic-
jury in its inevitable exercise of the power to determine tion in reaching 
whichh.murderers shall live and which shall die. And a ve:_~.!;:_t:.:~-
there is no way under the North Carolina law for the 
judiciary to check arbitrary and capricious exerci~ of 
that power through a review of death sentences.t<. In- {38) 
stead of rationalizing the sentencing process, a manda- ~""-··" 
tory scheme may well exacerbate the problem identified 
in Furman by resting the penalty determination on the 
pa.rticular jury's willingness to act lawlessly. While a 
mandatory death penalty statute may. reasonably be ex-
pected to increase the number of persons sentenced to 
death, it does not fulfill Furman's basic requirement by 
replacing arbitrary and wanton ,jury .discretion with ob-
jective standards to guide, regularize, and make ration-
ally reviewable th<:> process for imposing a sentence of 
·death. 
c 
A third constitutional shortcoming of the ~orth Car-
olina statute is its failure t.o allow the particularized 
consideration of relevant aspects of the character and 
record of each convicted defendant before the imposition 
upon him of a sentence of death. In Furman,~~ 
of the Court acknowledged what cannot fairly be de- ~ 
nied-that death is a punishment different from all other 
sanctions in kind rather than degree. See 408 U. S. , 
at 286-291 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); id., at 306' 
(STEWAHT, J., concurring). A process that accords no 
significance to relevant facets of the character and record-
@,..3~8 ~--,. Se.t' Gregg v. Georqia. -..2"f:=-'::-:: .. :,=::~---~[~L-;;n:-;t:~e~:·-~:p;:-p-. -;4~!.;:3 
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of the individual offender or the circumstances of the 
particular offense excludes from consideration in fixing 
the ultimate punishment of death the possibility of com-
passionate or mitigating factors stemming from the di-
verse frailties of humankind. It treats all persons con-
victed of a designated offense not as uniquely individual 
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferen-
tiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the 
penalty of death. 
This Court has previously recognized that "[f]or the 
determination of sentences, justice .generally requires 
consideration of more than the particular acts by which 
the crime was committed and that there be taken into 
account the circumstances of the offense together with 
the character and propensities of th.c....Qffender." Penn- - ::.;..') 
81Jlvania v. Ashe, 302 u.s. 4'C~(i937) :-c~atio'ii"1 SIJ ~ 
of both the offender and tlte offense i11 order to arrive "'""· ...,....._ · · 
at a. just and appropriate sentence has been viewed as a 
progressive and humanizing development. See Williams 
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-249 (1949); Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U. S., at 402-403 (BuRGER, C. J., dissent-
ing). While the prevailing practice of individualizing 
sentencing determinations generally reflects simply en-
lightened policy rather than a constitutional imperative, 
we believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect 
for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment, see 
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S., at 100 (plurality opinion), 
requires t1'M' consideration of the character and record 
of the individual offender and the circumstances of the 
particu1ar ot'fe.nse ~ a constitutionally indispensable 
part of the process cfft inflicting the penalty of death. 
This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that 
the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sen-
tence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its 
finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-
'·' 
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year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. 
Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corre-
sponding difference in the need for reliability in the de-
~ termination that death is the appropriate punishment ®. w 1n a speCificcase.1 
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the death 
sentences imposed upon the petitioners under North Car-
olimt.'s mandatory death sentence statute violated the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and therefore must 
~ ---oe-se£-aside:¥. The judgment of the Su-. 
~ preme CourtLis rever8ed msofar as it upheld tlie eat 
sentences imposed upon the petitioners, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
_ ... ..,Our determination that the death sentences in this case were 
imposed under procedures that violated constitutional standards 
makes it unnecessary to reach the question whether imposition of 
the death penalty on petitioner Woodson would haYe been so dis-
proportionate in compari~on in the nature of his invoh·emrnt in 
the capital offt>nsc as independently to violate the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments. SPC Gregg Y. Georgia, - U. S. -, -. 
39/ 
ante, p. 30. 
\..~ 
p. 2~, footnote 39 - Insert 4 
39 I 
I 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion proceeds 
on the faulty premise that if, as we hold in Gregg v. Georgia, ante , 
the penalty of death is not invariably a cruel and unusual punishment 
for the crime of murder, then it must be a proportionate and appro-
priate punishment for any and every murderer. regardless of the cir-
cumstances of the crime and the character and record of the offender . 
See post at p P· 20-21. 
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Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion in this case. 
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No. 75-5491 - Woodson v. North Carolina 
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting . 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
Erom: Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Circulated: fo/29)76 
Recirculated: __________ _ 
I dissent for the reasons set forth in my dissent in Furman 
v. Georgia, 4 08 U.S. 238, 4 05-414 (1972), and in the other dissenting 
opinions I joined in that case . Id., at 375, 414 and 465 . 
.• 
To: Tne Chief Justice 
Mr. Justi ce Brennan 
Mr. Justi.ce St ewart 
Mr . Justice Marshal l 
Mr . Justice Blackmun 
.~. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rohnquis t 
Mr . Justice Stevens t?-:-t:.L 
1st/DRAFT Fr om: Mr . Justice Wi1ite 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:~rculat ed : __ _ 
No. 75-5491 Recirculnted: & - 3n- 7C , 
James Tyrone Woodson 
and Luby Waxton, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
State of North Carolina. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of North 
Carolina. 
[June -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JusTICE J 
and MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. 
Following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 (1972), 
the North Carolina Supreme Court considered the effect 
of that case on the North Carolina criminal statutes 
which imposed the death penalty for first-degree murder 
and other crimes but \Vhich provided that "if the jury 
shall so recommend at the time of rendering its verdict in 
open court, the punishment shall be imprisonment for 
life in the State's prison, and the court shall so instruct 
the jury." State v. Waddell, 282 N. C. 431, 194 S. E. 
2d 19 ( 1973), determined that Furman v. Georgia invali-
dated only the proviso giving the jury the power to limit 
the penalty to life imprisonment and that thenceforward 
death was the mandatory penalty for the specified capital 
crimes. Thereafter N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14--17 was 
amended to eliminate the express dispensing power of the 
jury and to add kidnapping to the underlying felonies 
for which death is the specified penalty. As amended, 
the section reads as follows : 
"A murder which shall be perpetrated by means 
of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, tor-
ture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and 
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in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any 
arson, rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other 
felony, shall be deemed to be murder in the first 
degree and shall be punished with death. All other I 
kinds of murder shall be deemed murder in the sec-
ond degree, and shall be punished by imprisonment 
of not less than two years nor more than life im-
prisonment in the State's prison." 
It was under this statute that the petitioners in this case 
were convicted of first-degree murder and the mandatory 
death sentence imposed. 
The facts of record and the proceedings in this case 
leading to petitioners' convictions for first-degree murder 
and their death sentence appear in the opinion of MR. 
JusTICE STEWART, MR. JusTICE PowELL, and MR. JusTICE 
STEVENS (hereinafter the plurality). The issues in the 
case are very similar, if not identical, to those in Roberts 
v. Louisiana, post. For the reasons stated in my dissent-
ing opinion in that case, I reject petitioners' arguments 
that the death penalty in any circumstances is a violation 
of the Eighth Amendment and that the North Carolina 
statute, although making the imposition of the death 
penalty mandatory upon proof of guilt and a verdict of 
first-degree murder, will nevertheless resuit in the death 
penalty being imposed so seldom and a.rbitrarily that it is 
void under Furman v. Georgia. As is also app-arent from 
my dissenting opinion in Roberts v. Louisiana, I also dis-
agree with the two additional grounds which the plurality· I 
sua sponte offers for invalidating the North Carolina; 
statute. I would affirm the judgment of the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court.. 
.. 
1st DRAFT 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice SteNart 
M~. Justice White 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
r. Justice Powell 
r. Justice Rehnqu1st 
Mr. Justice Stevena 
From: Mr. Justice Mar shall 
UN 3 o 19'15 
Circulated:~-----------
· Recirculated: __________ __ 
·suPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 75-5491 
James Tyrone Woodson 
and Luby W axton, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
'State of North Carolina. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of North 
Carolina. 
[June -, 1976] 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL, concurring in the judgment. 
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in 
•Gregg v. Georgia, - U. S. - , - (1976) , I am of 
the view that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual 
punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. I therefote concur in the Court's 
.judgment . 
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WOODSON & WAXTON V. NORTH CAROLINA 
Petitioners in this case were convicted of participation 
in an armed robbery of a convenience food store, in the course 
of which the cashier was killed and a customer seriously wounded. 
There were four participants in the robbery: the petitioners 
Tyrone Woodson and Luby Waxton, and two others, Leonard Tucker 
and Johnnie Lee Carroll . . Tucker and Carroll testified for the 
prosecution after being permitted to plead guilty to lesser 
offenses; Woodson and Waxton testified on their own behalf. The 
stories told by Woodson, Tucker and Carroll were generally con-
sistent; Waxton's differed in some respects. 
According .to the testimony, the four men had been' dis-
cussing a possible robbery for some time. On the day of the 
robbery, June 3, 1974, Woodson and Tucker drank two bottles of 
' wine together. Woodson then left Tucker a'nd went over to the mobile 
home where he was staying with a friend, Brenda Pegues. He and 
Brenda then drank some beer together. About 9:30p.m., Waxton 
and Tucker came to the trailer. It is undisputed that Waxton 
hit Woodson after he came out of the trailer. Waxton testified 
that he did it because Woodson said something to "disre'spect" 
him; Tucker and Woodson testified it was to make Woodson sober 
up and come along on the robbery. 
The three went to Waxton's trailer where they met Carroll, 
who had borrowed his brother George Wiliie's car for the evening. 
Waxton, according to the testimony of the others, armed himself 
with a nickel-plated derringer. Tucker handed Woodson a rifle, 
which he carried into the front seat of the car. The four then 
set out. Carroll was driving, with Woodson in the front seat 
next to him. Tucker and Waxton rode in the back seat. The first 
time they came to the store, they went on by because there were 
too many customers. They went up a dirt road where Woodson got 
No. 75-5491 
out of the car and tested the rifle by firing it twice into the 
ground. They then returned to the store. 
Tucker and Waxto~ got out of the car and went into the 
store while Carroll and Woodson remained outside as lookouts. 
According to Tucker, whose story was partly corroborated by Carroll 
and Woodson, Tucker asked for, received, and paid for a package 
of Kools. Waxton in turn asked for cigarettes. As the cashier, 
Mrs. Shirley Whittington Butler, handed the pack to him, Waxton 
pulled the derringer out of his hip pocket, placed it, against 
Mrs. Butler's neck and fired one shot. Mrs. Butler fell back-
wards. Waxton took the money· tray from the register and gave 
it to Tucker, who carried it from the store. As he reached the 
door, Tucker ran into one R. N. Stancil, said "look out" and 
pushed past him. After he was outside, Tucker heard a second 
shot from inside the store, and a couple of minutes later Waxton 
came out, walking fast and carrying a handful of paper money. 
Tucker and Waxton got in the car and the four drove away. 
Waxton's testimony accorded with this testimony in most 
respects, save that he claimed he never had a gun and Tucker had 
shot both Mrs. Butler and Mr. Stancil. 
The four men were arrested and indicted for first degree 
murder and armed robbery. Waxton was also indicted for assault 
with a deadly weapon, with intent to kill, not resulting in death. 
This charge arose form the wounding of the customer R.N. Stancil. 
Before the trial of the two petitioners, Tucker and Carroll had 
1/ 
both been permitted to plead guilty to lesser offenses- and 
1/ Tucker was allowed to plead guilty to charges of accessory 
after the fact to murder and to armed robbery. He was sentenced 
to 10 years imprisonment on the first charge, and to not less 




had agreed to testify for the prosecution. During trial 
Waxton asked to be allowed to plead guilty to the same lesser 
offenses to which Tucker ha'd plea ded guilty, but the Solicitor 
2/ 
refuse_? to accept the pleas.- 11\Toodson maintained throughout --
the trial that he had been coerced by Waxt6n, that he was there-
fore innocent, and that he would not consider pleading guilty 
to anything. 
Petitioners were found guilty on all charges, and, as 
was required by the statute, sentenced to death. The Suoreme 
Court of North Carolina affirmed. State v. Woodson, 215 S.E.2d 
607, 287 N.C. 578 (1975). We granted certiorari, u.s. 
to consider whether the imposition of the death penalty in these 
cases comports with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution. 
2/ The Solicitor gave no reason for refusing to~cept 
Waxton's offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense. However, 
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in finding that the 
.Solicitor did not abuse his discretion, noted: 
"The evidence that Waxton planned and directed 
the robbery and that he fired the shots which 
killed Mrs. Butler and wounded Mr. Stancil is 
overwhelming. No extenuating circumstances gave 
the solicitor any incentive to accept the plea 
he tendered at the close of the State's evidence. 
* * * 
"Finally, we note that Waxton and Woodson were 
adults, aged 24 and 23 respectively; Tucker and 
Carroll were still in their teens, aged 18 and 
19 respectively. Carroll was obviously im-
pressed by Waxton, his older brother who, after 
an absence of eight years, had returned from New 
Jersey with a knowledge of karate and much other 
information he was no doubt willing to impart to 
a younger brother willing to learn." State v. 
Woodson and Waxton, 287 N.C. 578, 595-596; 215 
S.E.2d 607, (1975). 




North Carolina, prior to 1972, provided that in cases 
of first degree murder, the jury could in its unbridled discretion 
choose whether the convicted defendant should be sentenced to 
3/ 
death or to life imprisonment.- After the decision of this 
Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme 
Court of North Carolina considered the effect of Furman on the 
state capital felony statutes. In State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 
194 S.E.2d 19 (1973), it concluded that the holding of Furman was 
simply that the death penalty could not be imposed by a judge or 
jury who was free to impose it arbitrarily, but not that the 
death penalty was per se cruel and unusual. It then held that 
the section of the death penalty statutes which gave the jury 
the option of returning a verdic~ of guilty without capital 
punishment was unconstitutional, but that the provision was 
severable so that the statutes survived as mandatory death penalty 
!/ 
statutes. 
3/ The murder statute in effect in North Carolina until 
1973 read as follows: 
" § 14-17. Murder in the first and second degree defined; punishment. 
-A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, im-
prisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and 
premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt 
to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be dccmcci 
to be murder in the first degree and shall be punished with death: Provided, if at 
the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the jury shall so recommend, th<' 
punishment shall be impri sonment for life in the State's prison, and the cour~ shall 
so instruct the jury. All other kinds of murd er shall be deemed murder m the 
second degree, and shall be punished with imprisonment· of not less than two nor 
more than thirty years in the State's prison r." · N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14 -l 7 
(1969 repl. volume)'. 
4/ The Court characterized the effect of the statute without 
the defective sections as follows: 
"Upon the return of a verdict of guilty of 
any such offense, the court must impose a sentence 
of death. The punishment to be imposed for these 
capital felonies is no longer a discretionary 
question for the jury and therefore no longer a 
proper subject for an instruction by the judge." 
282 N.C. at 445. 
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The North Carolina General Assembly in 1974 followed 
the court's lead in enacting a new· version of N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 14-17 which was essentially unchanged from the prior version 
-- 5/ 
exce'pt _in making the death penalty mandatory.- Section 14-17 
now reads as follows: 
"Murder in the first and 
second degree defined; punishment.-A murder 
which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying 
in wait. imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any 
other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated 
killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetra-
tion or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, rob-
bery, kidnapping, burglary or other felony shall be 
deemed to be murder in the first degree and shall 
be punished with death. All other kinds of murder 
shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and 
shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than 
two years nor more than life imprisonment in the 
State's prison." 
It was under this staute that petitioners(, who corrunitted 




To: File Date: July 12, 1976 
From : Chris 1·fuitman 
CAPITAL CASES -- 1975 TERM 
In these cases, our primary responsibility was for 
Parts I, II, and III in No . 74-6257, Gregg v. Georgia . 
The development of the analysis for all five opinions, however, 
was a joint e~fort of the Powell, Stewart, and Stevens chambers. 
Justice Stewart's chambers took primary responsibility for 
Part IV of Gregg and Part III in the other four cases . Justice 
Stevens took primary responsibility for Part I in the four 
non-Gregg cases. Substantial editing was done by all 
three chambers on all parts of the five opinions. 
